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Our obligation is . . . not to mandate our own moral code. 
—Lawrence v. Texas1 
 
[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has tradition-
ally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . . 
—Lawrence v. Texas2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Forever, it seems, the power to shape public morality has 
been seen as central to American governance.3 As one of the 
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 1. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003) (quoting Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
 2. Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472). 
 3. As Justice Harlan commented in Poe v. Ullman, 
[T]he very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns 
indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the physical 
well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself 
with the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed, to attempt a 
line between public behavior and that which is purely consensual or 
solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of 
subjects with which every society in civilized times has found it nec-
essary to deal. 
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morality tradition’s chief promoters, the Supreme Court itself 
has regularly endorsed and applauded government’s police 
power to regulate the public’s morality along with the public’s 
health and welfare.4 
How, then, can we make sense of the Court’s declaration in 
Lawrence v. Texas5 that the state’s interest in preserving or 
promoting a particular morality among its constituents did not 
amount even to a legitimate interest to justify a Texas law 
criminalizing sexual intimacy between consenting adults?6 Has 
the Court unforeseeably and insupportably departed from its 
tradition of approving government action in the name of moral-
ity?7 
In fact, Lawrence did no such thing.8 Rather than repre-
 
367 U.S. 497, 545–46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 4. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470, 503 (1986) (citing Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905), for the 
proposition that the police power “is an exercise of the sovereign right of the 
Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare 
of the people”); infra Part I. 
Official action concerned with morality has traditionally reached a wide 
variety of laws and policies. As Harry Clor observed regarding contemporary 
morals-related government action, 
Though applications of the criminal law are often at the cutting edge 
of controversies over public morality, it is important to see that much 
more is involved in the subject than that. Also involved are questions 
about family and education: parental custody of children, criteria for 
the definition of a family, the fitness of teachers in public (and pri-
vate) schools, appropriate rules of behavior and disciplinary authority 
in the schools, and much else. 
HARRY M. CLOR, PUBLIC MORALITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY: ESSAYS ON 
DECENCY, LAW, AND PORNOGRAPHY 22–23 (1996). 
 5. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 6. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (“The Texas statute furthers no le-
gitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and 
private life of the individual.” (emphasis added)). Justice O’Connor’s concur-
rence characterized Texas’s justification for the challenged law as “promotion 
of morality.” Id. at 2486 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 7. See infra Part I and accompanying text regarding government reliance 
on morality to sustain official action. See also infra notes 24–31 for discussion 
of the meaning of morality. 
 8. The Court’s ruling in Lawrence can be read most conservatively as re-
jecting the legitimacy of a morals-based justification only in the context of re-
strictions on the conduct of private, consensual, noncommercial sexual rela-
tionships between two adults. More broadly, it can be understood as rejecting 
the use of morality justifications to support restrictions on unpopular groups. 
See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When a law ex-
hibits . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a 
more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under 
the Equal Protection Clause.”). Most broadly, Lawrence can be read as a com-
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senting a break with tradition, Lawrence reflected the Court’s 
long-standing jurisprudential discomfort with explicit morals-
based rationales for lawmaking.9 Notwithstanding its ubiqui-
 
plete rejection of the legitimacy of the morality justification. See id. at 2495 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Lawrence “effectively decrees the end of all 
morals legislation”). 
Under any interpretation, the decision marks the first time that a major-
ity of the Court has declared illegitimate a government’s interest in preserving 
or advancing the public’s morality. Thus, this Article’s argument regarding the 
Court’s steady distancing from morals justifications pertains to all interpreta-
tions of Lawrence’s morals-related holding.  
 9. By references to morals rationales and morality-based justifications, I 
mean justifications for government action that rely expressly on moral senti-
ment, such as Texas’s “promotion of morality” justification in Lawrence. Al-
though rationales that do not focus explicitly on promoting morality or deter-
ring immorality may also reflect moral positions, as discussed infra note 37 
and accompanying text, the focus here is on how the Court responds to overt 
claims that official action promotes the public’s morality or gives effect to soci-
ety’s moral disapproval. 
Although not the subject of this Article, the ages-old discourse about the 
role of law in enforcing morality supplies the backdrop against which the 
discussion here takes place. As Professor Louis Henkin observed, “[t]he 
relation of law to morals has been a favored preoccupation of legal 
philosophers for a thousand years.” Louis Henkin, Morals and the 
Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 402 (1963). 
Recent scholarship on the question whether law should give effect to mo-
rality has been voluminous and varied, and includes: CLOR, supra note 4; 
PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); JOEL FEINBERG, THE 
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985); LON 
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING 
MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1993); H.L.A. HART, 
LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963); MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, 
AND LAW (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND 
LEGAL THEORY (1999); Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on 
Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 15 GEO. L.J. 1871 
(1997); Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions 
of “Public Morality” Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the Pur-
poses of Equal Protection Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139 (1998); Ronald Dworkin, 
Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966); Chai R. 
Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 237 (1996); John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orienta-
tion”, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049 (1994); Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argu-
ment and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 
521 (1989); Jeremy Waldron, Particular Values and Critical Morality, 77 CAL. 
L. REV. 561 (1989); Don Welch, The State As a Purveyor of Morality, 56 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 540 (1988); Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic 
Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501 (1989) 
(reviewing PERRY, supra); Jeremy Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 597 (2000) (reviewing Richard A. Posner, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL 
AND LEGAL THEORY (1999)). 
For earlier scholarship on this question, see, for example, JOHN STUART 
MILL, ON LIBERTY (Alburey Castell ed., F.S. Crofts & Co. 1947) (1859); 
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tous rhetorical endorsements of government’s police power to 
promote morality, it turns out that the Court has almost never 
relied exclusively and overtly on morality to justify government 
action. Indeed, since the middle of the twentieth century, the 
Court has never relied exclusively on an explicit morals-based 
justification in a majority opinion that is still good law. 
This Article demonstrates and then explains this disso-
nance between the Supreme Court’s rhetorical tradition and 
jurisprudential reality regarding morals-based justifications for 
lawmaking.10 After elaborating the difficulties associated with 
judicial evaluation of morals rationales, I conclude that mere 
reference to morality should not suffice as a justification for 
lawmaking and propose, as a partial solution, that all justifica-
tions for government action, including those reflecting particu-
lar moral concerns, be tied to demonstrable facts. 
To set the stage for this Article’s arguments, Part I first 
develops a brief typology of morals-based rationales for gov-
ernment action as they are typically formulated in litigation be-
fore the Supreme Court. The discussion in Part I, together with 
the analysis in Part II, illustrates the clash between the Court’s 
 
ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS (2d ed. 1926). 
Outside of the scholarly literature, two of the best-known discussions of 
the relationship between law and morality include THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 
52 (Stein and Day 1963) and MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES  
§ 213.2, at 369–70 (Am. Law Inst. 1980) (recognizing that the criminal law 
“should be concerned with conduct that is morally reprehensible or culpable” 
but also that “[t]he criminal law cannot encompass all behavior that the aver-
age citizen may regard as immoral or deviate”). 
 10. Although lower federal courts and state courts also decide cases impli-
cating morals-based justifications, I focus on the Supreme Court here in part 
because most lower court jurisprudence regarding morality as a justification 
for lawmaking has been in reaction, both positive and negative, to Bowers v. 
Hardwick’s declaration of support for morality-based lawmaking. See, e.g., 
Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir. 2001) (relying on a morals jus-
tification, in light of Bowers, to uphold Alabama’s ban on sales of sex toys); Je-
gley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 345–46, 353 (Ark. 2002) (invalidating Arkan-
sas’s sodomy law on privacy and equal protection grounds and distinguishing 
the reasoning of Bowers); Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. App. 
2001) (relying on Bowers as the basis for accepting the State’s argument that 
the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law was justified by moral disapproval of 
“homosexual sodomy”), rev’d by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003); 
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497–503 (Ky. 1992) (distinguish-
ing Bowers’s privacy analysis and rejecting morality justification for a Ken-
tucky sodomy prohibition). In addition, because Lawrence has ended Bowers’s 
reign as the contemporary poster case for the morals-justification argument, 
the time is ripe to reconsider the Court’s actual, as opposed to rhetorical, mo-
rality jurisprudence. 
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rhetorically powerful embrace of morality and its actual prac-
tice of rarely relying on explicit morals rationales, even in the 
presumptive heyday of morals laws during the nineteenth cen-
tury. As Part II also shows, the trend in the last half-century 
has been toward reliance on anything but morality to justify re-
strictions. 
Part III develops two explanations for this trend that are 
related to the Court’s apparent concern about institutional 
credibility and capacity to screen morals rationales. As the first 
explanation points out, if the Court accepts a morals-based jus-
tification out of respect for majoritarian views, it cannot ensure 
against the majority’s misuse of morality as a benign cover for 
arbitrary or invidious aims,11 such as bias based on race or sex-
ual orientation.12 Deferring to the majoritarian impulse, in 
other words, does not permit the Court meaningfully to screen 
the morals rationales before it. 
On the other hand, as the second explanation highlights, if 
the Court does not defer to majoritarian sentiment, it may ap-
pear to be substituting its own views for those of the majority. 
Given the highly contested nature of morality in the United 
 
 11. The equal protection and due process guarantees require this assur-
ance under any standard of review. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
633 (1996) (“By requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to 
an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications 
are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the 
law.”); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992) (“[T]he Due Process Clause 
contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful gov-
ernment actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to imple-
ment them.’” (citation omitted)); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (invalidating zoning decision because it reflected a 
fear of people with mental retardation); United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Mo-
reno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (striking down a provision of the federal food 
stamp law because it reflected a dislike of an unpopular social group). 
 12. In Lawrence, for example, the Court found no legitimate state interest 
to justify Texas’s Homosexual Conduct Law, implying that the morality justi-
fication was functioning as a benign-sounding cover for arbitrary or invidious 
aims. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003) (“When homosexual 
conduct is made criminal by the law of the state, that declaration in and of it-
self is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in 
the public and in the private spheres.”). Justice O’Connor’s concurrence simi-
larly compared moral disapproval to a “bare desire to harm.” Id. at 2486 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
In the context of race discrimination, the Court rejected Virginia’s anti-
miscegenation law as impermissibly discriminatory in Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The Court disagreed with the Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals, which had sustained the law in part based on the state’s power to 
legislate regarding its constituents’ morality. See id. at 7.  
GOLDBERG.3FMT 4·18·2004  3:17 PM 
1238 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:1233 
 
States,13 judicial selection of one among numerous moral posi-
tions makes the potential for the appearance of countermajori-
tarian impropriety especially likely.14 Without a definitive 
moral code, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for the Court 
to demonstrate convincingly that its use of nonmajoritarian 
moral standards for screening morals-based justifications 
represents anything more than the individual Justices’ per-
sonal views.  
To escape this unpalatable bind, the Court has consistently 
avoided relying exclusively on explicit morals rationales to sus-
tain government action. Moreover, until Lawrence, the Court 
avoided overtly rejecting morals rationales for the same credi-
bility-related reasons. 
Yet, despite the institutional tension that afflicts judicial 
review of morals-based justifications for government action, 
moral sentiment has not been—nor could it be—banished en-
tirely from American law, as Part IV explains. Views about 
what constitutes good and bad behavior and about the conse-
quences of those behaviors for the well-being of society inevita-
bly affect opinions regarding the proper scope of government 
power.15 For example, we typically deem conduct harmful if it 
causes tangible physical or economic harm to another person—
say, throwing a pie at a political adversary. Our association of 
the pie throwing with bad behavior and cognizable harm is not 
inevitable, however. Instead it reflects a moral judgment about 
what constitutes harm. Rather than declaring the pie throwing 
to be a tort committed against the pie recipient, we might see 
the same act as a positive, self-actualizing, and nonharmful 
means of expressing emotion. We might celebrate the resulting 
 
 13. There may be broad societal agreement on certain types of conduct in 
interpersonal relationships, including regarding norms of courtesy and kind-
ness, but neither the civil nor criminal law typically enforces rules regarding 
these aspects of interpersonal relationships.  
 14. For general discussion of the countermajoritarian difficulty, see 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. Yale Univ. Press 1986). 
 15. See, e.g., NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE 
PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 15 (1998) (“We differ dramatically 
in our assessments of what counts as a virtue or vice, much less their rank or-
der.”); Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 710, 724 (1995) (“Moral judgment is needed to determine what 
count as relevant harms and to decide what are appropriate bases for legal 
regulation . . . .”). For a more detailed discussion of the definition of moral sen-
timent and its relationship to views about human behavior and government 
action, see also infra notes 24–31, 281–90 and accompanying text.   
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clothing stains, too, as a fashionable expression of that emotion 
rather than condemn them as an expensive injury entitled to 
redress. Similarly, the response of legislators and courts to a 
ban on nude dancing at bars as a means of reducing rising 
crime rates in surrounding neighborhoods16 may give unex-
pressed effect to the moral views of lawmakers and judges re-
garding nude dancing. In other words, as the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged, one person’s harm may be another’s de-
light.17 
How then can we reconcile the entangling of moral judg-
ments and lawmaking with courts’ inability to distinguish 
credibly between moral judgments and impermissible bias 
masquerading as morality? Or, put another way, what can be 
done to minimize the risk that moral justifications will be 
abused while still allowing moral judgments to remain a part of 
the law? After all, as just discussed, courts cannot rely simply 
on reference to morality alone to ensure that government action 
is nonarbitrary and free of impermissible bias.18 At the same 
time, credibility concerns should stop most courts from offering 
independent pronouncements about the validity of particular 
moral judgments.19 
 
 16. See infra notes 139–47 and accompanying text. 
 17. As the Court stated in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971), in 
reference to the defendant’s wearing into a courthouse a jacket emblazoned 
with a four-letter expletive, “it is . . . often true that one man’s vulgarity is an-
other’s lyric.” Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (“The right to free 
speech . . . may not be curtailed simply because the speaker’s message may be 
offensive to his audience.”); Papish v. Univ. of Mo. Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 
670 (1973) (“[T]he mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to 
good taste—on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name 
alone of ‘conventions of decency.’”); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 
(1970) (“‘[U]nder our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be 
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their 
hearers’ . . . .” (citation omitted)).  
 18. See supra note 11 (describing equal protection and due process stan-
dards). 
 19. Although the Court in Lawrence had no choice but to assess the mor-
als justification proffered for the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law since moral-
ity was the primary justification proffered, it avoided direct engagement with 
the law’s justification to the extent possible. See infra notes 191–96 and ac-
companying text. In addition, because morals support for government pun-
ishment of private sexual relations between consenting private adults has di-
minished considerably in recent years, the credibility risk ordinarily 
associated with judicial rejection of a popular moral argument had diminished 
as well. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480–81 (2003) (observing 
that contemporary laws and traditions reflect “an emerging awareness that 
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct 
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In Part V, I argue that only by steering clear of abstract, 
philosophical justifications for government action and relying 
instead on fact-based rationales can courts limit their exposure 
to this double-edged predicament. Thus, the solution that I ex-
plore here would permit morality-inspired government action 
only when it is supported by reference to empirical or otherwise 
demonstrable harms. While variations on this proposal have 
been addressed by others,20 I aim to add to the discussion by 
showing why the factual-grounding requirement is not only 
helpful but also compelled by the institutional-competence con-
cerns reflected in the Court’s current discomfort with morals 
rationales. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, I first want to defend 
the Article’s implicit premise that engagement with the Court’s 
doctrine regarding morals-based justifications for government 
action is a worthwhile enterprise. Some might argue that draw-
ing a distinction between explicitly empirical and explicitly 
moral justifications is overly formalistic because empirical jus-
tifications can be used to mask or support moral judgments. A 
broader version of this critique would maintain that doctrinal 
analysis itself is pointless given that doctrine can always be 
marshaled to serve a judge’s normative preferences.21 To some 
extent, these arguments cannot be overcome; the enterprise of 
adjudication involves judgment, not mechanical application of 
law to facts. As a result, the normative visions of judges will 
necessarily shape not only legal analysis but also assessments 
of empirical evidence. 
Still, even recognizing that doctrine reflects normative 
preferences, there are two ways in which attention to the 
Court’s analytic framework may constrain some of the bias that 
can otherwise permeate the adjudication process virtually un-
fettered. First, to the extent morals rationales are treated in 
the doctrine as legitimate and sufficient justifications for law-
making, they provide virtual carte blanche for government to 
act in the name of morality because they can be contested only 
 
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex,” and noting the decline in laws 
that prohibit sexual relations between consenting adults of the same sex).  
 20. See, e.g., Cicchino, supra note 9. 
 21. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1141, 1177 (2002) (suggesting that scholars consider “jettison[ing] the 
whole enterprise of taking constitutional doctrine seriously” on the grounds 
that the Court develops doctrine and decides cases to achieve ideological 
aims). 
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by other moral philosophical arguments.22 A doctrinal shift re-
quiring empirically-rooted justifications for government action 
would make it possible to expose judicial acceptance of particu-
lar government interests to empirical as well as normative cri-
tiques. 
Second, the Court’s endorsement of morals rationales may 
have the effect of encouraging courts and legislators to accept 
noncredible empirical justifications for government action when 
a morality-based justification is also identified. Because a claim 
of morality can justify virtually any legislation, criticism of a 
court’s empirical analysis will not likely affect either the analy-
sis or the outcome of a case. Without the safety net of a doctri-
nally preapproved morals rationale, however, judges and legis-
lators may be less enthusiastic about risking their reputations 
on acts for which the justification seems to be no more than 
thinly veiled dislike for the actors or actions being regulated.23 
The definition of morality and its relationship to other 
normative frameworks for judgment also warrant attention as 
an introductory matter. After all, one could argue that charac-
terizing a viewpoint as “moral” amounts to nothing more than a 
rhetorical flourish atop an ordinary normative judgment. On 
the other hand, a moral judgment could be said to have special 
qualities distinguishing it from other normative judgments or 
expressions of personal sentiment.24 The Supreme Court, more-
over, has not sought to define morality even in its most enthu-
siastic celebrations of the morals-based police power. However, 
as the next part’s detailed discussion of the cases illustrates, 
the Court tends to invoke morality to refer to a systematic way 
of thinking about right and wrong forms of conduct, consistent 
 
 22. Even in Lawrence, which rejected the sufficiency of the morals ration-
ale, the Court did not explain why the proffered morals justification was insuf-
ficient other than to indicate that a tradition of moral disapproval did not suf-
fice. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482–83 (2003); see also infra 
notes 194–96 and accompanying text. 
 23. Of course, shifting the doctrine is no guarantee of substantive change, 
as some courts will accept virtually any justification for government action 
that is framed in terms of facts. A shift, however, creates an opportunity to 
expose judicial reasoning to a fact-based, nonphilosophical analysis, which 
might be sufficient to constrain some of the undue judicial deference accorded 
to official articulations of government interests. See infra notes 293–99 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the possible benefits of a fact-based in-
quiry. 
 24. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 9, at 994–99 (analyzing the concept of a 
moral position). 
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with the term’s dictionary definition.25 I also use the term in 
that general sense.26 
Although the discussion here focuses on morality-based 
justifications, its theories and analysis would also apply to ra-
tionales for lawmaking based on tradition, social conventions, 
decency, ethics, majoritarian disgust, and other similar senti-
ments.27 That is, to the extent these positions reflect theoretical 
 
 25. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000) (defining morality as “[a] system of ideas of right 
and wrong conduct”). 
 26. Numerous scholars, however, have sought to develop a more refined 
definition of morality. Although these definitions do not pertain directly to our 
enterprise of assessing the Court’s response to morality-based rationales, they 
illustrate the challenges of even defining morality, let alone relying on it as a 
justification for government action. See, e.g., DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 15–17 
(linking morality to the views of the “right-minded person” and explaining that 
to be categorized as immoral, conduct must trigger “a real feeling of reproba-
tion” and “intolerance, indignation and disgust”); FEINBERG, supra note 9, at xi 
(distinguishing a “moral harm,” which causes one to become a “worse person,” 
from physical, psychological, or economic harms); PERRY, supra note 9, at 11, 
138 (describing morality as a community’s vision of how to lead a good life, but 
also advocating that communities “maintain a critical attitude towards the 
tradition”); POSNER, supra note 9, at 4 (“Morality is the set of duties to others 
(not necessarily just other people—the duties could run to animals as well, or, 
importantly, to God) that are supposed to check our merely self-interested, 
emotional, or sentimental reactions to serious questions of human conduct.”); 
Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 479 n.1 (1989) (de-
fining morality as including “principles about how a person should treat other 
people,” and distinguishing it from ethics, which includes “convictions about 
which kinds of lives are good or bad for a person to lead”); Dworkin, supra note 
9, at 994 (explaining that although morality is sometimes cited to refer to a 
group’s views “about the propriety of human conduct, qualities, or goals,” a 
moral position is more than mere sentiment and instead is supported by rea-
sons that are not based in “prejudice, rationalizations, matters of personal 
aversion or taste, arbitrary stands, and the like.”); H.L.A. Hart, Analytical Ju-
risprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor Bodenheimer, 105 
U. PA. L. REV. 953, 958 (1957) (defining morals as a form of “social control” 
and “an umbrella term sheltering many different objects requiring analysis”); 
Henkin, supra note 9, at 407 n.57 (arguing that while private morals “cannot 
be judged by standards of reasonableness,” society’s notions of “ordered lib-
erty” influence morality nonetheless); see also Lawrence C. Becker, Crimes 
Against Autonomy: Gerald Dworkin on the Enforcement of Morality, 40 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 959, 962 (1999) (“Both [H.L.A.] Hart and his predecessor 
[Mill] . . . have it in mind that morality encompasses ideals as well as duties, 
permissions as well as requirements, matters that seriously affect great num-
bers of people as well as matters of rather transient, local importance.” (citing 
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 70–74 (1963); JOHN STUART MILL, 
ON LIBERTY 12–13 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1956) (1859))). 
 27. For discussion of the relationship between tradition and lawmaking, 
see Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993); Mar-
tin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
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positions about the dividing line between good and bad,28 they 
present courts with challenges like those triggered by morals-
based rationales. 
Still, the analysis here focuses directly on invocations of 
morality rather than on these other potential explanations for 
lawmaking because morality has been celebrated historically as 
a legitimate basis for government action,29 and as a result, has 
acquired enormous symbolic power.30 Tradition, on the other 
hand, has received only qualified acceptance as a basis for offi-
cial action,31 and social conventions, disgust, and other norms 
are simply not cited at all by the Court as sufficient to justify 
lawmaking. 
I.  ENDORSEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT’S  
MORAL AUTHORITY 
As just highlighted, Lawrence v. Texas is the first case in 
which a majority of the Supreme Court has rejected explicitly a 
morality-based justification for a law on the ground that it 
lacked legitimacy.32 Yet the Court’s refusal to rely on a prof-
 
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the 
Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665 (1997). 
On the relationship between social norms and lawmaking, see, for exam-
ple, Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the Socialization of Chil-
dren, 91 CAL. L. REV. 967 (2003); Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485 (2003). 
Recent scholarship regarding the relationship between law and emotion 
includes, for example, Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal 
Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan, Anatomy of Disgust]; 
Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in PASSIONS OF LAW 
63 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999); Toni Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in 
PASSIONS OF LAW, supra, at 80; Martha C. Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”: 
Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in PASSIONS OF LAW, supra, at 19; Harlon L. 
Dalton, “Disgust” and Punishment, 96 YALE L.J. 881 (1987) (reviewing 
FEINBERG, supra note 9). And on the relationship between law and ethics, see, 
for example, Dworkin, supra note 9. 
 28. See, e.g., WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 194 (1997) 
(arguing that disgust “marks out moral matters for which we can have no 
compromise”); Kahan, Anatomy of Disgust, supra note 27, at 1624 (describing 
disgust as “brazenly and uncompromisingly judgmental”). 
 29. See infra Part I. 
 30. See generally MURRAY J. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 
(1964); Joseph R. Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of 
Designating Deviance, 56 CAL. L. REV. 54 (1968) (analyzing the symbolically 
powerful effect of legal declarations of immorality to preserve societal norms).  
 31. See infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 32. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480–81 (2003); see also Robin 
West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 
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fered morals rationale turns out not to be a sudden break with 
earlier jurisprudence, as we will see shortly. Still, the outright 
rejection of a morals rationale marks a stark shift from the 
consistent rhetorical embrace of morals-based lawmaking for 
the past two centuries, and that rhetorical history therefore 
warrants attention. To provide context for the analysis that fol-
lows, this section will first offer a typology of morals rationales 
and then sketch the contours of the surrounding jurispruden-
tial landscape. 
A. A TYPOLOGY OF MORALS RATIONALES 
Morals-based justifications for lawmaking arise in a vari-
ety of ways. By grouping these appearances into four catego-
ries—pure, composite, embedded, and inert—the typology of-
fered here is intended to provide a systematic framework for 
the analysis that follows. 
Morality rationales appear, at times, in their purest form 
as the sole explicit rationale for government action. Bowers v. 
Hardwick33 and Lawrence are prime examples of instances 
where the Court considered whether morality, alone, sufficed to 
justify challenged laws.34 As the discussion below demonstrates, 
 
663 (1990) (commenting that Bowers was “arguably . . . the first time” the 
Court had adopted an “explicitly conservative jurisprudential account of the 
‘natural’ right of the community to define and enforce the good in law” by ref-
erence to conventional morality).  
 33. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472. 
 34. Texas had proffered a family values rationale for the Homosexual 
Conduct Law in addition to its morals-based justification, but the Court did 
not consider that argument in its opinion. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 
(“[The case] does not involve whether the government must give formal recog-
nition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”); Respon-
dent’s Brief at 4, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102) (argu-
ing that criminalizing the sexual acts of same-sex couples was “in keeping 
with long-standing national tradition, and bears a rational relationship to the 
worthy governmental goals of implementation of public morality and promo-
tion of family values” (emphasis added)), available at 2003 WL 470184; see 
also Brief of Amici Curiae Pro Family Law Center et al. at 6, Lawrence (No. 
02-102) (“While Petitioners strenuously compare themselves to the loving het-
erosexual families who have existed over the course of human history, this 
same history bears out the indisputable truth that monogamous mari-
tal/conjugal relationships do not ordinarily result in the transmission and 
spread of deadly diseases and other economically costly effects.”), available at 
2003 WL 470115; Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Arizona Policy and Pro-
Family Network in Support of Respondent at 15, Lawrence (No. 02-102) 
(“[L]esbians and gay men do not characteristically form social units compara-
ble to the family and sexual relationships of heterosexuals.”), available at 2003 
WL 367560; Amicus Brief of the Center for Marriage Law in Support of Re-
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the Court has rarely relied solely on a pure invocation of moral-
ity and, since World War II, has never done so, with the excep-
tion of the now-reversed ruling in Bowers.35 
At other times, a morals rationale for government action is 
relied on together with a government interest in reducing 
harms or increasing benefits that are material or otherwise ob-
servable. For example, the Court’s older cases frequently sus-
tained alcohol-related restrictions in the interests of the public 
health and morality.36 We can describe these rationales as com-
posite because the concern with morality does not stand alone 
but instead appears coupled with other grounds for the exercise 
of government power. 
In addition to the pure and composite manifestations of 
morals rationales in the Court’s decision making, the govern-
ment’s interest in morality may be accepted implicitly and, 
therefore, not surface in a superficial review of the Court’s deci-
sions. For example, in numerous cases that might be thought of 
as implicating morality, such as zoning limitations on adult en-
tertainment businesses, bans on obscenity, and restrictions on 
the use of foul language, morality is not even mentioned in the 
majority’s analysis of the challenged measures, let alone relied 
upon.37 Still, in these cases, it is conceivable, or at times even 
probable, that the Court understood and accepted the govern-
ment’s moral interest, even as it relied on some other justifica-
tion to sustain the law. I refer to these situations as involving 
an embedded morals rationale. 
To a certain extent, the composite and embedded responses 
to morals rationales are coextensive; for both, moral considera-
 
spondent at 1, Lawrence (No. 02-102) (“The Center is deeply anxious that 
nothing in this Court’s decision establish precedent that would weaken the le-
gal status of marriage and the family.”), available at 2003 WL 367565.  
 35. Indeed, the Court has grappled with the sufficiency of a pure morals 
justification only in the rare instance that no harm-based argument has been 
advanced to support the government action at issue. Thus, the distinction be-
tween moral disapproval and harm-based justifications can be said to charac-
terize the Court’s analytic practice, even if the distinction itself is not philoso-
phically valid to the extent that all harms ultimately reflect moral judgments. 
See infra notes 286–89 and accompanying text.  
 36. See, e.g., Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 198 (1925) (recognizing 
the “possible vicious uses” of alcohol and holding that the legislature could 
suppress alcohol use “in the interest of public health and morality”); see also 
infra notes 51–52, 97–103 and accompanying text. 
 37. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (sustaining a 
ban on nude dancing based exclusively on secondary effects and without men-
tion of morality in the majority opinion); see also infra Part II.C.1. 
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tions might underlie a justification that is not explicitly morals-
based. For example, a public safety argument related to height-
ened crime rates in the vicinity of adult entertainment busi-
nesses might be offered on its own or jointly with a morals jus-
tification to support restrictions on a venue that offers shows 
with nude dancers. Yet it would be naïve to think that the pub-
lic safety argument, which has the appearance of being rooted 
in empirical rather than moralistic concerns, might not func-
tion, in some (or many) cases, as a neutral-sounding cover for 
deeper moral disapprobation of that form of adult entertain-
ment. 
Finally, morals rationales also appear in an inert form. 
These are situations in which the Court touts moral sentiment 
as a component of the police power or otherwise as a legitimate 
and sufficient basis for government action but does not actually 
rely on morality in its analysis.38 The inert appearance of mor-
als rationales is thus unlike the composite use, because moral-
ity is not relied on formally by the Court, and unlike the em-
bedded use, because the morals rationale is explicit.39 
 
 38. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 125, 129 
(1978) (including morality within the scope of a state’s police powers but sus-
taining application of a landmark preservation law based on a city’s power “to 
enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic 
features of a city”); see also infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 39. Although this typology and the analysis that follows concentrate on 
the Supreme Court’s reactions to morality as a justification for government 
action, the Court has also grappled with moral sentiment in other contexts, 
including discussions of the moral culpability of death row defendants, the 
scope of crimes of moral turpitude, and the application of good moral character 
requirements, among others. These other discussions of morality also help il-
lustrate the ways in which moral judgments remain a constant part of law-
making. However, they typically involve assessments of whether a party pos-
sessed a particular type of blameworthiness or had committed a specified type 
of misconduct and thus are not directly relevant to the project here, which fo-
cuses on the legitimacy and sufficiency of morality as a justification for gov-
ernment action. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306, 321 (2002) (rul-
ing that the capital punishment of people with mental retardation is 
unconstitutional because “disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and 
control of their impulses” show that such defendants “do not act with the level 
of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal con-
duct”); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377–78 (1989) (rejecting the argu-
ment that sixteen- and seventeen-year olds are “less morally blameworthy” for 
purposes of the death penalty); Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 323 n.2, 
334–35 (1970) (upholding a jury-selection procedure that excluded individuals 
for, inter alia, crimes of moral turpitude (citing Franklin v. South Carolina, 
218 U.S. 161, 167–68 (1910) (affirming a jury-selection procedure that limited 
jury participation to those of “good moral character”)); Schware v. Bd. of Bar 
Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (“A state can require high standards of 
GOLDBERG.3FMT 4·18·2004  3:17 PM 
2004] MORALS-BASED LAWMAKING 1247 
 
B. EXALTATION OF THE MORALS-BASED POLICE POWER 
THROUGH THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY 
As this section will illustrate, the libertarian themes of in-
dividualism and liberty of contract that dominated nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century jurisprudence did not carry over 
into the realm of morals-based lawmaking. Instead, a belief in 
communitarianism functioned as the norm that guided gov-
ernment oversight of the populus,40 with morals concerns per-
vading the criminal law, licensing rules, and other measures.41 
Although historians disagree about the effect of these regula-
tions on daily life,42 there is no question, as the following dis-
 
qualification, such as good moral character . . . before it admits an applicant to 
the bar . . . .”); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) (finding that 
a bar applicant’s membership in an antiestablishment political party did not 
negate “good moral character”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227–32 
(1951) (reviewing the use of the term “moral turpitude” in connection with 
commission of fraud in general and in immigration law specifically); State v. 
Horton, 248 S.E.2d 263, 264 (S.C. 1978) (concluding that a “hit and run” of-
fense was a moral turpitude offense because it was “contrary to justice, hon-
esty and good morals”). 
 40. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Law and Morals in Classical Legal Thought, 
82 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1444 (1997). 
 41. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 149–90 (1996). 
 42. Professor Novak has contended that “[i]f there was a transformation 
in attitudes toward morality around 1776, it lay in the direction of increased 
rather than decreased public attention. The postrevolutionary era witnessed 
the origins of one of the most concerted and energetic moral reform move-
ments in American history.” NOVAK, supra note 41, at 152; see also id. at 189 
(“Despite historical talk of tolerance, cities of eros, Victorian compromises, or a 
wholesale paradigm shift from morals to property, the regulation of public mo-
rality continued to play an absolutely central role in nineteenth-century 
American life. Morals police remained one of the matter-of-fact obligations of 
government in a well-regulated society.”). This interest in the public’s morals 
was enabled further by the “relatively homogeneous opinion on a broad range 
of morality questions” among decision makers. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 
1440; see also David H. Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of Morals in Early 
America, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 209 (Donald Fleming & Bernard 
Bailyn eds., 1971) (noting “[t]he universal acceptance of Christianity in the 
American colonies” and the “accompanying harmoniousness of moral outlook”). 
As a result, according to Professor Hovenkamp, a veritable “fervor to use the 
state to regulate morals” took hold. See Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1439. 
Others, however, have contended that the colonial-era treatment of sin as 
crime began to dissipate following the American Revolution. See, e.g., JOHN 
D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 157 (1988) (“In the antebellum era, Americans seemed 
to be more interested in individual purification through internalized control 
than in the public regulation of sexual expression.”); Flaherty, supra, at 214 
(“[I]n many significant ways the colonists were not as strict as they might 
have been concerning the extent to which law and morals should be identi-
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cussion illustrates, that government regularly exercised its au-
thority with an eye to its constituents’ morals as well as their 
physical well-being.43 
The police power became the conceptual focal point for 
much of the discussion regarding morality during this period, 
with early commentators enthusiastically reinforcing the 
state’s power over morals. For example, Judge Thomas M. Coo-
ley, a leading commentator on the police power just after the 
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, declared that “pres-
ervation of the public morals is peculiarly subject to legislative 
supervision.”44 Ernst Freund, another leading expositor of the 
 
cal.”); William E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the 
Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450 (1967) 
(tracing the shift from criminal laws based on morality to criminal laws 
focused on the preservation of property); Harry N. Scheiber, Private Rights 
and Public Power: American Law, Capitalism, and the Republican Polity in 
Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 823 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM J. 
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1996)) (suggesting that the regulatory trend was not as 
strong as Novak contended). See generally Donna I. Dennis, Obscenity Law 
and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 27 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 369 (2002) (reviewing NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED 
INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN 
AMERICA (1988) and ALISON M. PARKER, PURIFYING AMERICA: WOMEN, 
CULTURAL REFORM, AND PRECENSORSHIP ACTIVISM, 1873–1933 (1997) and 
discussing the historiography of censorship and sexual speech in the United 
States during the nineteenth century).  
 43. Of course, the use of state powers to legislate morality did not begin in 
the nineteenth century. In the colonial era, for example, although the power to 
uphold community morality was vested in the secular rather than the reli-
gious leadership of the community, sin and crime were indistinguishable in 
the eyes of lawmakers. See Flaherty, supra note 42, at 206 (“The moral law 
was the official guideline for the enforcement of morals in the American colo-
nies and the basis of the civil law itself. Sin and crime, divine law and secular 
law, the moral law and the criminal law were all closely intertwined.”); id. at 
208 (“The essential contribution of the moral law to the secular law was the 
equation of sin and crime.”).  
Laws of that era cut a broad swath, often covering not only an array of 
sexual interactions but also the use of profane language and the failure to at-
tend Sabbath services, among other restrictions. See id. at 224. 
 44. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATION POWER OF THE STATES OF 
THE AMERICAN UNION 596 (1868). 
Providing examples of the police power’s reach, Judge Cooley illustrated 
the breadth of moral concerns a government might pursue. 
[The police power grants government the power to] forbid the keep-
ing, exhibition, or sale of indecent books or pictures, and cause their 
destruction if seized; or prohibit or regulate the places of amusement 
that may be resorted to for the purpose of gaming; or forbid altogether 
the keeping of implements of gaming for unlawful games; or prevent 
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police power writing a few decades later, described morals laws 
as essential to our civilization.45 He advocated that “[t]he culti-
vation of moral, intellectual and aesthetic forces and interests 
which advance civilization and benefit the community . . . can-
not be a matter of indifference to the state.”46 
1. Supreme Court Support for Restrictions on Alcohol and 
Lotteries and Other Games of Chance 
The Supreme Court likewise revealed its views on the rela-
tionship between law and morals through its police power ju-
risprudence during the late nineteenth century and early twen-
tieth century. Although the earliest discussions concerned 
public health and safety,47 the police power quickly came to be 
understood as providing carte blanche for a wide array of mor-
als legislation.48 Indeed, shortly after Judge Cooley set out his 
 
the keeping and exhibition of stallions in public places. And the power 
to provide for the compulsory observance of the first day of the week 
is also to be referred to the same authority. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 45. See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 7 (1904). 
 46. Id. at 9. 
 47. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (describing po-
lice powers as an “immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing 
within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government . . . . 
Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description . . . are com-
ponent parts of this mass.”). 
 48. By 1847, the Court was speaking of the morality-based powers of 
states with respect and familiarity. See, e.g., Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 
U.S. (5 How.) 504, 592 (1847) (“[I]f [an item] . . . be injurious to the health or 
morals of the community, a State may, in the exercise of that great and con-
servative police power which lies at the foundation of its prosperity, prohibit 
the sale of it.”), overruled in part by Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); cf. 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY (2004) (explaining that, until the Fourteenth Amendment’s pas-
sage, “the propriety of state laws received minimal federal scrutiny” because 
neither the Bill of Rights nor most of the Constitution’s provisions applied to 
the states). 
In addition, although the Supreme Court first declared that the federal 
government’s police powers operated only outside of state limits (e.g., the Dis-
trict of Columbia) in United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 45 (1869), it 
later relented and recognized Congress’s power to regulate in the interest of 
public morals. See, e.g., Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 356–
57 (1903). 
In later years, the police power has been characterized in a variety of 
ways but is generally viewed as the power of government to act on behalf of its 
constituents’ welfare, broadly construed to encompass, inter alia, the public’s 
health, safety, and morals. See BARNETT, supra (discussing the evolution of 
the police power). See generally Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The 
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view of the police power’s parameters, the Court, in 1877, in 
Beer Co. v. Massachusetts,49 affirmed the broad scope of the po-
lice power with respect to moral regulation while upholding a 
Massachusetts restriction on beer manufacture and sale. 
  Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and 
boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it may be to 
render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that 
it does extend to the protection of the lives, health, and property of 
the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public 
morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the 
power to provide for these objects. They belong emphatically to that 
class of objects which demand the application of the maxim, salus 
populi suprema lex; and they are to be attained and provided for by 
such appropriate means as the legislative discretion may devise.50 
A decade later, in Mugler v. Kansas,51 the Court also upheld a 
similar Kansas law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of 
liquor, reasoning that the state legislature may exert its police 
power “to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate 
or needful for the protection of the public morals.”52 
 
Evolving Police Power: Some Observations for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 511 (2000) (analyzing the expansion and contraction of the police 
power). 
 49. 97 U.S. 25 (1877). 
 50. Id. at 33 (first emphasis added); see also id. (“[A]s a measure of police 
regulation, looking to the preservation of public morals, a State law prohibit-
ing the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to any 
clause of the Constitution of the United States . . . .” (citing Bartemeyer v. 
Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873))). The Latin phrase salus populi suprema 
lex is frequently translated to mean “the welfare of the people is the supreme 
law.” 
 51. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
 52. Id. at 661. In Mugler, the Court indicated that judicial review of exer-
cises of the police power will consider whether “a statute purporting to have 
been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public 
safety . . . [has a] substantial relation to those objects” and, if not, will invali-
date the measure as “a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental 
law.” Id. 
Numerous other cases involving liquor restrictions that were decided later 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reiterated the police powers’ 
reach to morality as well as to public health and welfare. See, e.g., Samuels v. 
McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 198 (1925) (noting that the legislature can seek to 
suppress the use of liquor in the interest of public health and morality); Crane 
v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304, 307–08 (1917) (upholding a ban on alcohol posses-
sion because it was intended to protect public morality and did so); Cosmopoli-
tan Club v. Virginia, 208 U.S. 378, 384 (1908) (finding that a state can protect 
“the health, the morals, and the prosperity of the people” through liquor regu-
lation); Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108, 115 (1904) (upholding a law banning 
women from entering saloons and noting that the sale of liquor “is a question 
of public expediency and public morality”); Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 
348 (1900) (observing that the Commerce Clause does not forbid a legislative 
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In the context of government suppression of lotteries and 
other games of chance, the Court in the nineteenth century 
likewise applauded government regulation of morality at both 
the state and federal levels. Declaring that “the suppression of 
nuisances injurious to public health or morality is among the 
most important duties of Government,”53 the Court in the Lot-
tery Case54 upheld Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause to ban the use of interstate commerce for lotteries in the 
interest of morality. 
As a State may, for the purpose of guarding the morals of its own 
people, forbid all sales of lottery tickets within its limits, so Congress, 
for the purpose of guarding the people of the United States against 
the “widespread pestilence of lotteries” and to protect the commerce 
which concerns all the States, may prohibit the carrying of lottery 
tickets from one state to another.55 
In the related context of gaming, the Court added that no 
evidence would be necessary to establish moral danger.56 As the 
Court explained, 
 
body from coming “deliberately to the conclusion that a due regard for the pub-
lic safety and morals requires a suppression of the liquor traffic”); Scott v. 
Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 91–92 (1897) (upholding a liquor sale restriction on, inter 
alia, morals grounds); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 558, 564–65 (1891) (same); 
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890) (noting that the “police power 
of the State is fully competent to regulate the [liquor] business—to mitigate its 
evils or to suppress it entirely” for the purpose of public morality).  
 53. Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 356 (1903) (citing 
Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850)). 
 54. 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
 55. Id. at 357. The Court added: 
In legislating upon the subject of the traffic in lottery tickets, as car-
ried on through interstate commerce, Congress only supplemented 
the action of those States—perhaps all of them—which, for the pro-
tection of the public morals, prohibit the drawing of lotteries, as well 
as the sale or circulation of lottery tickets, within their respective lim-
its. It said, in effect, that it would not permit the declared policy of 
the States, which sought to protect their people against the mischiefs 
of the lottery business, to be overthrown or disregarded by the agency 
of interstate commerce. We should hesitate long before adjudging that 
an evil of such appalling character, carried on through interstate 
commerce, cannot be met and crushed by the only power competent to 
that end. 
Id. at 357–58. For additional cases affirming government regulation of moral-
ity in the lottery context, see Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897); Stone 
v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); 
Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163 (1850). 
 56. Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623, 629 (1912); see also Marvin v. 
Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 224 (1905) (observing that “[f]or a great many years past 
gambling has been very generally in this country regarded as a vice to be pre-
vented and suppressed in the interest of the public morals and the public wel-
fare”). 
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  [t]hat the keeping of a billiard hall has a harmful tendency is a 
fact requiring no proof . . . . [M]unicipal authorities [may] tak[e] legis-
lative notice of the idleness and other evils which result from the 
maintenance of a resort where it is the business of one to stimulate 
others to play beyond what is proper for legitimate recreation.57 
Further reinforcing the presumption of harm, the Court 
also invoked a 1672 decision by Lord Hale upholding a ban on 
bowling alleys “because of the known and demoralizing ten-
dency of such places.”58 
2. Support for Early Sexuality Restrictions 
The Court also sustained morals restrictions regarding 
sexuality. Outside the context of polygamy,59 however, the 
Court did not address the constitutionality of a single sexual-
ity-related prohibition in the nineteenth century.60 Then, in 
1900, the Court upheld a New Orleans ordinance designating 
the neighborhood in which a “‘public prostitute or woman noto-
riously abandoned to lewdness’” could reside.61 In L’Hote v. New 
Orleans, the Court reinforced that states not only have the au-
thority but also the “duty” to exercise the police power “to pro-
tect the public health and morals.”62 That authority, the Court 
said, was “beyond question.”63 
 
 57. Murphy, 225 U.S. at 629. 
 58. Id. at 630 (citing Rex v. Hall, 2 Keble, 846 (1672)).  
 59. One of the leading cases to address polygamy during this era was 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which never specifically men-
tioned morality but upheld the application of a polygamy prohibition on the 
grounds that it was a permissible response to an “offence against society.” Id. 
at 165. 
 60. Much state regulation, including laws restricting sexual conduct, was 
immune from federal constitutional challenge during the nineteenth century 
under the then-prevailing view that the Bill of Rights did not apply to state 
action. See Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (holding 
the Takings Clause inapplicable to state action); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 323–25 (1937) (describing the process of selective incorporation 
of Bill of Rights guarantees against the states). 
 61. L’Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 588 (1900) (quoting NEW 
ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCE NO. 13,032 § 2 (1897)). In Davis v. Beason, 133 
U.S. 333 (1890), overruled in part on other grounds by Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 634 (1996), the Court upheld a polygamy-related restriction on vot-
ing rights, holding that to exempt polygamy from punishment would shock a 
community’s moral judgment.  
 62. L’Hote, 177 U.S. at 596. But see Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 
144, 148 (1909) (holding that Congress exceeded its power in making it a crime 
to support a non-citizen to become a prostitute or to participate in immoral 
behavior).  
 63. L’Hote, 177 U.S. at 596; see also Cosmopolitan Club v. Virginia, 208 
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Likewise, in Hoke v. United States,64 the Court upheld the 
White Slave Traffic Act, commonly known as the Mann Act, 
which at that time prohibited transporting women and girls 
across state lines for “‘the purpose of prostitution or debauch-
ery, or for any other immoral purpose.’”65 The Court drew a 
connection between the government’s power to regulate moral-
ity in this sexuality-related context and its similar power in 
other contexts. 
[S]urely, if the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away 
from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene litera-
ture, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of food 
and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the systematic en-
ticement to and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of 
women, and, more insistently, of girls.66 
As the cases of this era illustrate, the Court did not merely 
 
U.S. 378, 384 (1908) (acknowledging a state’s “power to care for the . . . morals 
of its people” through legislative enactments). 
 64. 227 U.S. 308 (1913). 
 65. Id. at 317–18 (quoting 36 Stat. 825 (1910)). The Act was amended in 
1986 to authorize prosecution for “any sexual activity for which any person 
can be charged with a criminal offense” rather than for “debauchery” and 
“immoral purpose.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421 (2000). 
In upholding the Mann Act, the Court affirmed that Congress, through its 
interstate commerce powers, had as much authority to address moral welfare 
as it had to promote material welfare. Hoke, 227 U.S. at 322 (“[I]t must be 
kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved to the States 
and those conferred on the Nation are adapted to be exercised, whether inde-
pendently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and 
moral.”). The Court also, once again, affirmed the states’ power to legislate in 
the name of morality: “There is unquestionably a control in the States over the 
morals of their citizens . . . .” Id. at 321.  
 66. Id. at 322. Although the transportation at issue in Hoke was for com-
mercial purposes, four years later, in Caminetti v. United States, the Court re-
lied on the same moral authority embodied in the interstate commerce powers 
to uphold the Mann Act’s application to men who had crossed state lines with 
women for noncommercial purposes. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 
491–92 (1917). Eventually, the Mann Act’s reference to “other immoral pur-
poses” was construed to mean prostitution. See Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559, 
563 (1934); see also infra note 157. 
Around the same time, the Court also upheld censorship of films for the 
protection of public morals. See, e.g., Mut. Film Corp. v. Hodges, 236 U.S. 248 
(1915). See generally Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: 
Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society—From Anthony 
Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1992) (reviewing cen-
sorship efforts and the judicial response to them throughout the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries). 
The early twentieth century also saw the Supreme Court invoke the pro-
tection of public morality to justify racial segregation. See, e.g., Berea Coll. v. 
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 48 (1908) (upholding a government effort to prevent 
children of different races from being educated together). 
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accept the proposition that government could properly concern 
itself with the public’s morals. Instead, it went further, opining 
with some regularity that attention to the citizenry’s morals 
was among government’s most important responsibilities. 
C. THE PRESUMED LEGITIMACY OF MORALS JUSTIFICATIONS 
SINCE THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY 
From the mid-twentieth century onward, the Court contin-
ued to offer rhetorical support for morals-based laws, albeit 
with less fervor than it had in earlier opinions. Three points are 
noteworthy regarding the context of these contemporary en-
dorsements of morals-based lawmaking. First, composite mor-
als justifications came up increasingly often in connection with 
prohibitions on expression, rather than on conduct, and typi-
cally were accompanied by additional state interests in the 
general welfare. Second, the other major group of cases to en-
dorse government’s morals-based lawmaking authority fits 
within the inert type described above. These cases included mo-
rality in routine descriptions of government’s police powers but 
did not appear to rely on it to sustain government action, as in 
environmental regulation cases. Third, in contrast to the first 
two types of post-war cases involving morals-based justifica-
tions, Bowers stands alone in its endorsement and acceptance 
of a pure morals-based justification for lawmaking. 
Turning first to the expression-related cases, we find that 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,67 a 1942 case affirming a defen-
dant’s conviction for cursing at a police officer, laid the 
groundwork for repeated endorsements of the government’s 
moral authority. In sustaining the restraint on expression at 
issue, the Court had observed that some words “are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social inter-
est in order and morality.”68 
This “social interest in order and morality” phrase then be-
gan to appear routinely in other cases, typically without elabo-
ration, to support state regulation of lewd and obscene publica-
tions and performances.69 In Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, for 
 
 67. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 68. Id. at 572. 
 69. The “social interest” phrase appeared in over twenty-five lead opinions 
of the Court between 1949 and 2003, most, but not all, of which concerned re-
straints on socially undesirable speech, including symbolic speech. See, e.g., 
Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1547 (2003) (ruling that a ban on cross 
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example, a majority of the Court, stressing the “‘right of the 
Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society,’” upheld 
the exhibition of an allegedly obscene film at an “adult” thea-
ter.70 In doing so, the Court reinforced the legitimacy of a legis-
lature acting “to protect ‘the social interest in order and moral-
ity.’”71  
The second major category of cases to address the state’s 
power to regulate morality since the mid-twentieth century in-
cludes opinions that reference moral authority in routine de-
scriptions of the police power but do not otherwise mention mo-
rality. Zoning and environmental regulation cases are chief 
among these. 
In Berman v. Parker, for example, the Court reiterated the 
familiar mantra regarding the police power’s coverage in a 
unanimous decision that sustained governmental authority to 
consider aesthetics as well as public health in asserting emi-
nent domain powers for redevelopment purposes.72 “Public 
safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and or-
 
burning was constitutional); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 
(1992) (striking down a blanket prohibition on hate or bias-motivated speech); 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (finding no First 
Amendment protection for socially undesirable speech by a student in a secon-
dary school setting); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 
485, 504 (1984) (affirming a decision against a loudspeaker manufacturer in a 
product disparagement suit in which a consumer product organization 
published an inaccurate, but nonmalicious, review of loudspeakers); New York 
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982) (ruling that child pornography is beyond 
First Amendment protection); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 
(1978) (upholding a federal prohibition on the daytime broadcast of sexually 
explicit and offensive speech); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 
(1975) (striking down a statute that prohibited the publication of the identity 
of a rape victim where information was a matter of public record); Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (reversing a ruling against a 
magazine publisher that knowingly mischaracterized a nonpublic figure); 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21, 24 (1973) (limiting unprotected obscene 
speech to, inter alia, materials that “appeal to the prurient interest in sex” and 
“portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way”); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that there is no First Amendment 
protection for obscene materials); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257 
(1952) (sustaining a statute that criminalized libelous statements against par-
ticular groups). 
 70. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1973) (quoting 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)). For 
further discussion of the relationship of decency to morality, see infra note 131 
and accompanying text. 
 71. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 61 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 
(affirming the government’s power to regulate obscenity)). 
 72. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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der—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the 
traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs,” 
the Court wrote.73 
But immediately following this description of the police 
power, the Court suggested that none of those grounds was the 
precise source of the government’s ability to exercise its power 
to condemn land for redevelopment. Instead, as the Court ex-
plained, the references to public safety, health and morality 
“merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit 
it.”74 Thus, whatever the precise source of governmental author-
ity to consider aesthetics as well as public health in redevelop-
ment projects, it is different from the government’s power to 
regulate morality.75 
Third, in contrast to the often terse endorsement of morals-
based lawmaking that appeared in Chaplinsky and the inert 
reference to morality in routine police powers descriptions just 
described, stands the Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick.76 As the sole case to rely purely on an explicit morals jus-
tification, Bowers offered the strongest support for the morals-
based lawmaking power in the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury.77 Specifically, the Court wrote, “the presumed belief of a 
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is 
immoral and unacceptable” sufficed to justify the law’s prohibi-
 
 73. Id. at 32. 
 74. Id. In elaborating on the reach of the police power, the Court also em-
phasized the power’s broad scope. “An attempt to define its reach or trace its 
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The defini-
tion is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the 
purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable 
of complete definition.” Id. 
 75. As in Berman, support for government regulation of morality appears 
frequently in dicta in cases challenging official restrictions on private prop-
erty. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 
503 (1987) (describing the police power as “‘an exercise of the sovereign right 
of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general 
welfare of the people, and . . . paramount to any rights under contracts be-
tween individuals.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 
473, 480 (1905))); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 
(1978) (same); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 144 (1978) 
(affirming “‘[t]he power which the States have of prohibiting such use by indi-
viduals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the 
safety of the public’” (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887))). 
 76. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 
(2003). 
 77. Id. at 196. 
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tion of oral and anal sex.78 
Dissenting in Lawrence, Justice Scalia pointed to Bowers to 
reinforce the pervasiveness of “‘laws representing essentially 
moral choices.’”79 “Countless judicial decisions and legislative 
enactments have relied on the ancient proposition that a gov-
erning majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is ‘immoral 
and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for regulation,” 
he wrote.80 Interestingly, though, Justice Scalia did not point to 
a single Supreme Court decision to support his arguments but 
instead cited to a smattering of lower court rulings that relied 
on Bowers to uphold laws implicating moral judgments.81 The 
complete absence of Supreme Court holdings reinforcing Bow-
ers’s support for morals-based regulation further highlights 
Bowers’s anomalous role amidst post–World War II precedent.82 
Yet even if Bowers stood alone in its pure reliance on a 
morals justification, the array of cases described above, with 
their regularized repetition of government’s moral regulatory 
powers, has produced and fortified the sense of normalcy of 
laws enacted for the purpose of controlling society’s morals.83 
 
 78. Id. As many commentators noted and the Supreme Court itself later 
acknowledged, the Georgia law did not single out sexual relations between 
same-sex partners and, instead, prohibited oral and anal sex to anyone in the 
state. See, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003) (“[T]he Georgia 
statute [at issue in Bowers] prohibited [sodomy] whether or not the partici-
pants were of the same sex . . . .”); see also, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, History, 
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants 
of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988) (analyzing the historical in-
accuracy of the discussion in the majority and concurring opinions in Bowers 
regarding the Georgia law and the history of regulating sodomy). 
 79. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 
478 U.S. at 196).  
 80. Id. (citations omitted). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing Bowers as the 
Court’s first embrace of a purely morals-based justification for lawmaking). 
 83. Of course, neither the morals laws nor the Court’s rhetoric has put an 
end to the behaviors they deem immoral. Not only did the laws not halt im-
moralities themselves, but they may also have played a role in encouraging 
and broadening the reach of behaviors deemed immoral, particularly in the 
area of sexuality. See Dennis, supra note 42, at 389 (observing “[t]he failure of 
obscenity law to control immorality” while examining the law’s “significant 
and far-reaching consequences for antebellum cultural and economic prac-
tices” including “the development of both sexual speech and markets for ‘ob-
scene’ publications”); Flaherty, supra note 42, at 227 (“Despite their good in-
tentions about upholding public morality, . . . immorality had been and 
continued to be a significant problem.”); R.W. Roetger, The Transformation of 
Sexual Morality in “Puritan” New England: Evidence from New Haven Court 
Records, 1639–1698, 15 CANADIAN REV. OF AM. STUD. 243, 255 (1984) (identi-
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The Court in Bowers added force to this position by declaring 
that “[t]he law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality, 
and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be 
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be 
very busy indeed.”84 Although many lower courts distinguished 
or rejected Bowers’s support for pure morals-based restric-
tions,85 others, including those relied on by Justice Scalia, em-
braced Bowers’s argument that moral concerns alone sufficed to 
justify government action.86 Whether that embrace should con-
tinue in the absence of Bowers requires us to examine the rela-
tionship between the Court’s actual reliance on morals justifi-
cations and its pro-morals regulation rhetoric. The next part 
takes up this inquiry.  
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S MORAL DISCOMFORT 
Given the near-reflexive support in the Supreme Court’s 
opinions for states’ interventions to protect the public morality, 
it may seem absurd even to question the Court’s commitment 
 
fying “transformation in sexual morality . . . during the seventeenth century” 
when magistrates “used their discretionary powers to enforce laws in a man-
ner that reflected popular attitudes toward sexual misconduct” and “‘ordinary’ 
sex crimes ceased being prosecuted and . . . fornicators received lenient sen-
tences precisely as their numbers swelled”). See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978) 
(discussing ways in which official constraints on sexual relations shaped inter-
est in and meaning of sexual acts). 
Further, as a practical matter, scholars tend to agree that people of color, 
poor people, and other marginalized populations bore the brunt of enforce-
ment. These observations about disparate and targeted enforcement remain 
consistent even where scholars disagree about the overall severity or fre-
quency of enforcement. See, e.g., D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 42, at 86 
(“In the nineteenth century, sexuality continued to serve as a powerful means 
by which white Americans maintained dominance over people of other races.”); 
id. at 215 (noting sterilization laws were passed “to prevent reproduction of 
those whom proponents viewed as undesirable”).  
 84. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) overruled by Lawrence 
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 85. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002) (invalidating Ar-
kansas’s sodomy law); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) 
(striking down Kentucky’s sodomy law); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 
1997) (striking down Montana’s deviate sexual conduct law’s criminalization 
of same-sex partners’ sexual relations); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 
250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding Tennessee’s sodomy prohibition invalid). 
 86. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining 
that “[c]ountless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have relied on 
the ancient proposition that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual 
behavior is ‘immoral and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for regula-
tion” and citing several cases in support of that proposition). 
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to its own rhetoric.87 After all, the possibility that the govern-
ment’s interest in morality might not be sufficient to justify 
government action had never been admitted by a majority of 
the Court prior to Lawrence, let alone the possibility that the 
government’s interest in morality might be illegitimate. 
By taking a closer look at the range of cases involving dis-
cussions of morality and some of the debate surrounding those 
cases, however, this part will demonstrate that little conviction 
has existed on the Court, especially since the mid-twentieth 
century, to rely on the moral authority promised to the states. 
Instead, majority opinions in cases referencing and endorsing 
government’s power to regulate morals have almost never re-
lied exclusively on an explicit, pure reference to morality to up-
hold a law, typically choosing instead to sustain government 
action based on observable societal harms. Further, even where 
morals justifications held sway in certain contexts, later, simi-
lar cases reveal the majority distancing itself from those morals 
rationales and relying on other grounds to uphold the chal-
lenged restriction.  
A. CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN’S MORE LIMITED THEORY OF THE 
POLICE POWER 
Another early leading theorist of the police power provides 
valuable context for this empirical argument about the Court’s 
avoidance of morality-based justifications. As we saw above, 
several early scholars of the police power advocated precisely 
the type of broad, morals-encompassing authority for the state 
that I contend the Court actually shied away from in adjudicat-
ing morals cases. Their view, however, was not held univer-
sally, even in the nineteenth century. For example, in sharp 
contrast to Judge Cooley’s view that the state could respond to 
violations of morality in the same manner as it would to tres-
passes and other injuries to persons or property88 stood the 
work of Professor Christopher G. Tiedeman. 
 
 87. See Henkin, supra note 9, at 401–02 (“The authority of the state, un-
der the Constitution, to enact ‘morals legislation’—laws reflecting some tradi-
tional morality having no authentic social purpose to protect other persons or 
property—has always been assumed; it has deep roots, and it has seemed ob-
vious and beyond question.”); id. at 413 (“[T]he right of the state to legislate in 
the field of morals, to deprive the citizen of liberty or property for the sake of 
accepted notions of morality, is deeply part of our law; some will argue that it 
is beyond question or need for justification.”).  
 88. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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In his late nineteenth-century treatise, Professor Tiedeman 
described the police power as simply the power of the govern-
ment to establish “measures for the enforcement of the legal 
maxim, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas.”89 Echoing John 
Stuart Mill, who was writing around the same time, Professor 
Tiedeman asserted that “[t]he object of police power is the pre-
vention of crime, the protection of rights against the assaults of 
others.”90 
Taking this argument further, Professor Tiedeman flatly 
rejected morality as a basis for regulating. He wrote: “The po-
lice power of the government cannot be brought into operation 
for the purpose of exacting obedience to the rules of morality, 
and banishing vice and sin from the world.”91 
Perhaps anticipating opposition to his position, Professor 
Tiedeman also spelled out a three-step argument supporting 
his denunciation of morals laws. First, he took as “conceded by 
all, that vice cannot be punished unless damage to others can 
be shown as accruing or threatening.”92 He then argued that 
because the connection between vice and damage is attenuated, 
at best, vice cannot be shown to be the cause of damage—“[t]he 
intervention of so many co-operating causes in all cases of re-
mote damage makes this a practical impossibility.”93 As a re-
sult, he concluded, because it is a “practical impossibility” to 
prove that a vice caused harm to another, government should 
not regulate conduct solely on the ground that the conduct con-
travenes prevailing morality.94 
 
 89. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF 
POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 150 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1886). The 
Latin phrase translates to “use what is yours so as not to injure another’s.” 
 90. Id.; see also MILL, supra note 9. 
 91. TIEDEMAN, supra note 89, at 150. 
 92. Id. at 151. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 153. In another version of the same point, Professor Tiedeman 
emphasized the lack of connection between violation of moral prohibition and 
injuries to the rights of another: 
The moral laws can exact obedience only in foro conscientioe. The 
municipal law has only to do with trespasses. It cannot be called into 
play in order to save one from the evil consequences of his own vices, 
for the violation of a right by the action of another must exist or be 
threatened, in order to justify the interference of law. It is true that 
vice always carries in its train more or less damage to others, but it is 
an indirect and remote consequence; it is more incidental than conse-
quential. At least it is so remote that very many other causes co-
operate to produce the result, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
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Although we will see some exceptions to his theory, Profes-
sor Tiedeman has turned out largely to be correct in anticipat-
ing the future of morals justifications, if not the future of all 
laws that reflect moral visions. While I suggest in Part III that 
engagement with pluralism, rather than difficulty with causa-
tion, is primarily responsible for pushing the Court away from 
its support for morals-based rationales, Tiedeman’s observa-
tions forecast well the difficulties presented by majoritarian 
morals laws. 
The remainder of this section will focus on illustrating the 
trend away from reliance on morals justifications by looking 
first at what might be thought of as the cornerstone morals 
cases of the nineteenth and early twentieth century—those 
dealing with alcohol, lotteries and gaming, blasphemy, and po-
lygamy. Then, the discussion will turn to the latter part of the 
twentieth century for an in-depth exploration of trends in adult 
sexual speech and expression cases, which are among the pri-
mary contemporary cases decided by the Supreme Court in 
which explicit references to morality have played a role. This 
section will also include discussion of developments in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence regarding Sunday closure laws, regulation 
of sexual acts, and family recognition law, where concerns 
about morals are not necessarily explicit but are inevitably in-
tegral to the underlying legislation at issue.95 
B. THE NON-MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CORNERSTONE 
MORALITY CASES 
Notwithstanding the frequent endorsement of the state’s 
moral authority in nearly all police power cases decided from 
the nineteenth century through the mid-1940s,96 none of these 
cases rely exclusively on morality. Instead, the decisions tend 
to rely at least as much on governmental responsibility for pub-
lic health or physical safety as on morality, fitting them neatly 
 
ascertain which is the controlling and real cause. 
Id. at 150. 
 95. As illustrated above, the Court provides rhetorical support for gov-
ernment’s power to enforce morals laws in numerous other cases. However, 
this section will limit discussion only to those cases in which a morals justifi-
cation actually was at issue. Other cases, like the zoning and environmental 
regulation cases that provide rhetorical reinforcement of the government’s 
power to regulate the public’s morals, fall within the inert type and do not en-
gage substantively with morals rationales. See supra notes 72–75 and 
accompanying text. 
 96. See supra notes 47–66 and accompanying text. 
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within the embedded type described earlier. 
Among the cases that discuss morality in the context of the 
police power, those concerning alcohol restrictions are, far and 
away, the most numerous.97 But for as much as those cases 
dramatize the moral threat posed by alcohol, the Court never 
left the morality concern to stand alone. Instead, risks to the 
public health and other secondary effects associated with alco-
hol consumption, such as crime, loomed at least as large as the 
prospect of moral decline. In 1877, for example, when analyzing 
a challenge to a Kansas prohibition law, the Court coupled dis-
cussion of alcohol’s moral dangers98 with concerns that “the 
public health . . . and the public safety, may be endangered by 
the general use of intoxicating drinks.”99 Pointing to specific 
harms, the Court stated that “we cannot shut out of view . . . 
the fact established by statistics accessible to every one, that 
the idleness, disorder, pauperism, and crime existing in the 
country, are in some degree at least, traceable to this evil.”100 
Later cases picked up this theme and put even further 
stress on the harmful effects of liquor not just on morality but 
also on the public health and material welfare.101 In Samuels v. 
McCurdy,102 the last of the Supreme Court’s early police power 
cases to address restrictions on alcohol, the Court acknowl-
edged the “demoralizing” effect of alcohol, but it stressed 
equally that the state’s power to control liquor included the 
 
 97. This can be understood, in part, because liquor regulations were 
among the few types of regulations potentially subject to federal constitutional 
review under Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 242 (1833), which limited 
the Bill of Rights’ application to state action. See also supra note 60. 
 98. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887); see also supra notes 51–
52 and accompanying text. 
 99. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662. 
 100. Id.  
 101. For example, in Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890), the Court 
explained that the injury to a drinker of alcohol 
first falls upon him in his health, which the habit undermines; in his 
morals, which it weakens; and in the self-abasement which it creates. 
But, as it leads to neglect of business and waste of property and gen-
eral demoralization, it affects those who are immediately connected 
with and dependent upon him. 
Id. at 91. 
Underscoring the centrality of the multiple risks alcohol posed to society, 
the Court added that “[b]y the general concurrence of opinion of every civilized 
and Christian community, there are few sources of crime and misery to society 
equal to the dram shop, where intoxicating liquors, in small quantities, to be 
drunk at the time, are sold indiscriminately to all parties applying.” Id. 
 102. 267 U.S. 188 (1925). 
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power “to avoid the abuses which follow in its train.”103 
In addition to the liquor cases, the lottery and gaming 
cases represent another cornerstone of ardent judicial support 
for morals legislation in nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. Yet, there too, the Supreme Court often refrained from re-
lying exclusively on moral harms. In an observation made first 
in an 1850 case upholding a Virginia law banning the sale of 
lottery tickets and repeated in several subsequent lottery cases, 
the Court pointed not only to the lottery’s moral dangers but 
also to its deleterious economic effects.104 The lottery, it wrote, 
further impoverishes those who are poor; it “preys upon the 
hard earnings of the poor; it plunders the ignorant and sim-
ple.”105 In 1905, the Court again stressed the dangers of gam-
bling to both the public welfare and the public morals. Reflect-
ing popular support for gambling restrictions, the Court 
commented that “[f]or a great many years past gambling has 
been very generally in this country regarded as a vice to be 
prevented and suppressed in the interest of the public morals 
and the public welfare.”106 
If we consider the Court’s analysis of gaming laws today, 
we find that morality-based aims, while still present, exist 
amidst an even broader array of concerns about the effects of 
gambling. For example, in a case analyzing Puerto Rico’s au-
thority to limit gambling advertisements, the Court recognized 
 
 103. Id. at 197–98. 
 104. Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163, 168 (1850). 
 105. Id.; see also Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 356 
(1903) (making the same observation as in Phalen about the lottery’s impover-
ishing effect); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 496 (1897) (same); Stone v. 
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879) (same). 
 106. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 224 (1905). Because the Court relied on 
interests in morality and public welfare in conjunction with each other, we can 
conclude that the two are conceptually distinct and that concern with welfare 
is not simply a restatement of the morals-based concern. In Berman v. Parker, 
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954), the Court isolated welfare from other police powers and 
described it in the following sense: 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it 
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as mone-
tary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the 
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as 
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 
Id. (citation omitted); see also Cicchino, supra note 9, at 140–41 (“‘Public wel-
fare’ arguments . . . assert[] that the law avoids harms or realizes goods other 
than the good of eliminating or increasing the behavior or characteristic that 
defines the classification the law creates—for example, health, safety, or eco-
nomic prosperity.”).  
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that concerns about crime, corruption, and other problems far 
more visible in daily life than breaches of moral precepts sup-
ported the Commonwealth’s actions. 
The Tourism Company’s brief before this Court explains the legisla-
ture’s belief that “[e]xcessive casino gambling among local resi-
dents . . . would produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety 
and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of 
moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering 
of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of 
organized crime.” These are some of the very same concerns, of 
course, that have motivated the vast majority of the 50 States to pro-
hibit casino gambling. We have no difficulty in concluding that the 
Puerto Rico Legislature’s interest in the health, safety, and welfare of 
its citizens constitutes a “substantial” governmental interest.107 
Given that almost every state currently allows some form of 
gambling and that federal law does not categorically bar all ad-
vertisement for gambling and lotteries, we can safely conclude 
that, today, the Court would not rely solely on morality to up-
hold official restrictions on a lottery.108 
 
 107. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 
(1986) (citation omitted). Indeed, in explaining Puerto Rico’s authority to regu-
late speech regarding casinos, the Court analogized to a state’s authority to 
regulate speech regarding cigarettes, alcohol, and prostitution. Id. at 346. 
 108. As of 1988, only two states did not permit any form of legalized gam-
bling. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 847–48 (1988) (detailing 
state laws related to minors’ participation in gambling activities). Lotteries 
remain prohibited at the federal level. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 
U.S. 418 (1993). In Edge Broadcasting, the Court supplied a useful history of 
federal efforts to control lotteries. 
Congress has, since the early 19th century, sought to assist the States 
in controlling lotteries. In 1876, Congress made it a crime to deposit 
in the mails any letters or circulars concerning lotteries, whether ille-
gal or chartered by state legislatures. This Court rejected a challenge 
to the 1876 Act on First Amendment grounds in Ex parte Jackson. In 
response to the persistence of lotteries, particularly the Louisiana 
Lottery, Congress closed a loophole allowing the advertisement of lot-
teries in newspapers in the Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, and this Court 
upheld that Act against a First Amendment challenge in In re Rapier. 
When the Louisiana Lottery moved its operations to Honduras, Con-
gress passed the Act of Mar. 2, 1895, which outlawed the transporta-
tion of lottery tickets in interstate or foreign commerce. This Court 
upheld the constitutionality of that Act against a claim that it ex-
ceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause in Lottery Case. 
This federal antilottery legislation remains in effect. After the advent 
of broadcasting, Congress extended the federal lottery control scheme 
by prohibiting, in § 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, the 
broadcast of “any advertisement of or information concerning any lot-
tery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.” In 1975, Congress amended 
the statutory scheme to allow newspapers and broadcasters to adver-
tise state-run lotteries if the newspaper is published in or the broad-
cast station is licensed to a State which conducts a state-run lottery. 
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Polygamy cases, which constitute the third cornerstone of 
early morals legislation, present more of a challenge than the 
alcohol and gambling cases because the Court has so vigorously 
highlighted the moral roots of the polygamy prohibition. As the 
Court effused in an 1885 case considering the disfranchisement 
of male voters with multiple wives, for example, monogamous 
marriage of a man and woman is “the best guaranty of that 
reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress 
in social and political improvement.”109 
Yet around the same time in another condemnation of po-
lygamy, the Court took pains to identify not just the moral 
harm but the other, more visible injuries it associated with plu-
ral marriage. Bigamy and polygamy, the Court said, “tend to 
destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace 
of families, to degrade woman and to debase man.”110 Even fur-
ther, in Reynolds v. United States,111 the majority opinion never 
once mentioned the word “morality,” characterizing polygamy 
instead as an “offence [sic] against society.”112 Explaining that 
concept, the Court focused particularly on one commentator’s 
observation that “polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, 
and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the peo-
ple in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long ex-
ist in connection with monogamy.”113 The risk of polygamy, in 
 
This exemption was enacted “to accommodate the operation of legally 
authorized State-run lotteries consistent with continued Federal pro-
tection to the policies of non-lottery States.” 
Id. at 421–23 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
Similarly, with respect to lottery advertising, rather than prohibiting it 
entirely, the federal government has reflected a state’s own preferences re-
garding lotteries within its advertising restrictions. Id. at 428 (“Instead of fa-
voring either the lottery or the nonlottery State, Congress opted to support the 
anti-gambling policy of a State like North Carolina . . . and [a]t the same time 
it sought not to unduly interfere with the policy of a lottery sponsoring State 
such as Virginia.”); see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999) (observing that federal law does not prohibit 
all advertising of gambling). 
 109. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885). 
 110. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890), overruled on other grounds 
by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). 
 111. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (sustaining a criminal conviction for violation of 
bigamy prohibition). 
 112. Id. at 165. 
 113. Id. at 166. Interestingly, the Court conceded that the portended disas-
trous political consequences might not actually flow from sanction of polyg-
amy. While endorsing the government’s authority to restrict polygamy, the 
Court acknowledged that “[a]n exceptional colony of polygamists under an ex-
ceptional leadership may sometimes exist for a time without appearing to dis-
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other words, was not moral debasement of the individuals in-
volved but instead the undermining of American government. 
This is not to say that the public’s morality was only a sec-
ondary concern of polygamy prohibitions. Rather, this close 
look at the cases simply highlights that even assuming moral 
disapproval would have been sufficient to sustain polygamy 
prohibitions, the Court opted not to rely on morality alone and 
instead rested on a composite justification addressing other, 
concrete risks purportedly posed by plural marriage.114 
The last of the classic morals law cornerstones, blasphemy 
prohibitions, has received virtually no substantive analysis by 
the Supreme Court.115 Only two of the earliest cases offer an ex-
tended analysis of the government interest supporting a blas-
phemy prohibition, but those rely on religious reasoning that 
would not be acceptable today. For example, in considering 
whether a church could legally employ an English pastor in 
1892, the Court’s reasoning rested largely on the nation’s em-
brace of Christianity: 
The people of this state . . . profess the general doctrines of Christian-
ity, as the rule of their faith and practice; and to scandalize the au-
thor of these doctrines is not only, in a religious point of view, ex-
 
turb the social condition of the people who surround it.” Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (discussing the 
state’s “considerable interest in preventing bigamous marriages and in pro-
tecting the offspring of marriages from being bastardized”). Because Cleveland 
v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946), was a statutory interpretation case fo-
cused on whether a polygamous marriage fit within the Mann Act’s prohibi-
tion of interstate transport of women for “immoral” purposes, its exclusive fo-
cus on the immoral nature of polygamy is not directly relevant here.  
Further, for the purpose of identifying the Court’s reliance on morals-
based justifications to sustain law, it bears noting that only ten majority opin-
ions since 1950 have even mentioned the word “polygamy” and none engaged 
in a substantive analysis of the reasons supporting prohibitions of polygamous 
marriage. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (mentioning polygamy in the 
course of distinguishing Davis, 133 U.S. at 333, from a Colorado amendment 
precluding antidiscrimination protections for lesbians, gay men, and bisexu-
als); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (noting the validation of po-
lygamy convictions in the context of evaluating justifications for the Sunday 
closure law).  
 115. The Court has mentioned blasphemy in eight lead opinions since 1950 
and four prior to that time. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 
(1982) (noting the states’ power to punish blasphemy in a ruling upholding a 
child pornography prohibition); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 n.15 
(1968) (mentioning a witness’s reference to blasphemy law in a decision in-
validating an evolution statute). For an insightful analysis of blasphemy juris-
prudence and its relationship to First Amendment values, see generally 
Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, 
and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1968).   
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tremely impious, but, even in respect to the obligations due to society, 
is a gross violation of decency and good order.116 
Likewise, nearly fifty years earlier, the Court explained, in the 
context of a dispute regarding a trust, that “Christianity is a 
part of the law, so that blasphemy can be punished, but not for 
the purpose of invading the conscience of other persons.”117 
In addition, Cantwell v. Connecticut,118 which is perhaps 
the closest contemporary relative of these cases, considered 
whether a speaker who criticized another’s religion could be 
prosecuted for inciting a breach of the peace.119 Its analysis, 
however, was entirely different from the analysis used in the 
two cases just discussed. In reversing the speaker’s conviction, 
the Court emphasized that while government may prohibit 
speech that incites violence, it may not intervene on the 
grounds that listeners may be deeply offended.120 Concerns 
about the preservation of a community’s religious sensibilities, 
which presumably related to that community’s moral norms, 
did not even appear in the Court’s reasoning, much less guide 
the outcome of the case. 
C. MORALS JUSTIFICATIONS IN THE POST–WORLD WAR II ERA 
While the cases just discussed show that the Court did not 
rely exclusively on morality even in the supposed heyday of 
morals legislation, contemporary cases take the jurisprudence 
even further from pure dependence on morals rationales. The 
last several decades of cases bring into sharp relief that the 
post–World War II Court has never relied exclusively on moral-
ity to sustain government action with the exception of the now-
 
 116. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470 (1892) 
(quoting People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294 (1811)). The Court added: 
The free, equal, and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion, 
whatever it may be, and free and decent discussions on any religious 
subject, is granted and secured; but to revile, with malicious and 
blasphemous contempt, the religion professed by almost the whole 
community, is an abuse of that right. Nor are we bound, by any ex-
pressions in the constitution as some have strangely supposed, either 
not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like attacks 
upon the religion of Mahomet or of the Grand Lama; and for this 
plain reason, that the case assumes that we are a Christian people, 
and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity, 
and not upon the doctrines or worship of those impostors. 
Id. at 470–71 (quoting Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 295). 
 117. Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 154 (1844). 
 118. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 119. Id. at 303. 
 120. Id. at 308–09. 
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discredited Bowers v. Hardwick.121 Although some of the cases 
discussed below amass a majority for the rhetorical proposition 
that moral concerns appropriately trigger government’s regula-
tory powers, the lack of exclusive reliance on, and affirmative 
avoidance of, morals rationales is unmistakable.122 
To expose this trend, I will turn first and primarily to the 
cases involving restrictions on “adult entertainment” estab-
lishments, including book stores, movie theaters, and nude 
dancing establishments that offer for sale sexually explicit per-
formances or materials. Then, to demonstrate that disen-
chantment with morals rationales is not limited to the adult 
entertainment context, I will look to the Court’s analysis of re-
strictions on particular sexual acts, the cases regarding restric-
tions on “offensive” noncommercial speech, the “blue laws” ju-
risprudence, the Court’s treatment of non-nuclear family 
formations, and finally, to the analysis of the morals justifica-
tion in Lawrence.  
1. The Sexual Entertainment Cases 
Given both the moralistic terms of the public debate about 
sexually explicit entertainment123 and the Court’s strong rhe-
torical support for morals-based lawmaking,124 the argument 
that a majority of the Court has not relied exclusively on mor-
als rationales in the last fifty years, other than in Bowers, may 
be somewhat surprising. Even more surprising may be the use 
 
 121. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003); see also supra notes 76–82 and accompanying 
text. 
 122. A related trend is the disappearance of litigation before the Supreme 
Court involving certain types of traditional morals regulations, like the prohi-
bitions against lotteries and gambling, which were so heavily morality de-
pendent in the Court’s century-old opinions. See supra notes 49–66 and ac-
companying text. However, the reduction in these regulations cannot 
completely explain the Court’s nonreliance on morals rationales in light of mo-
rality’s continuing relevance to other contemporary restrictions. 
The question whether the shifting away from morals justifications and 
concomitant embrace of new, harm-based rationales amounts to more than a 
semantic difference is addressed infra at notes 300–16 and accompanying text.  
 123. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 329 (2000) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens quoted a lawmaker’s statement supporting 
Erie’s ban on nude dancing establishments: “We’re not talking about nudity. 
We’re not talking about the theater or art . . . . We’re talking about what is in-
decent and immoral . . . . We’re not prohibiting nudity, we’re prohibiting nu-
dity when it’s used in a lewd and immoral fashion.” Id. (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
 124. See supra Part I. 
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here of the adult entertainment cases to illustrate that a 
majority of the Court has been leaving morals-based rationales 
entirely untouched. The against-the-current nature of these ar-
guments is underscored further by Justice Scalia’s regular con-
tention that “[o]ur society prohibits, and all human societies 
have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm oth-
ers but because they are considered, in the traditional phrase, 
‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e., immoral.”125 
It turns out, however, that the traditional presumption re-
garding the validity of morals-based justifications for lawmak-
ing is not as reliable as Justice Scalia’s statement suggests. Let 
us begin with Paris Adult Theatre,126 the first case decided after 
the Court developed the framework that currently governs con-
stitutional analysis of obscenity restrictions.127 At issue in Paris 
Adult Theatre was the constitutionality of an injunction prohib-
iting the showing of two allegedly obscene films.128 As was its 
habit, the Court rhetorically affirmed the sufficiency of morals-
based rationales, referring to Chaplinsky’s determination that 
a legislature can act legitimately to protect “the social interest 
in order and morality.”129 
Yet the decision itself specifically disavowed reliance on 
moral interests. “The issue in this context,” the Court wrote, 
“goes beyond whether someone, or even the majority, considers 
the conduct depicted as ‘wrong’ or ‘sinful.’”130 Stressing that the 
restriction of the films was not rooted in moral views, the Court 
 
 125. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (plurality opin-
ion) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia added: 
In American society, such prohibitions have included, for example, 
sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitu-
tion, and sodomy. While there may be great diversity of view on 
whether various of these prohibitions should exist (though I have 
found few ready to abandon, in principle, all of them), there is no 
doubt that, absent specific constitutional protection for the conduct 
involved, the Constitution does not prohibit them simply because they 
regulate “morality.” 
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 310 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in judgment) (endorsing the government’s power to encourage “good 
morals”). 
 126. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
 127. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing the 
framework for evaluating obscenity prohibitions). 
 128. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 51–52. 
 129. Id. at 61 & n.12 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 
(1957), in turn quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942)). 
 130. Id. at 69. 
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observed that  
[t]he States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that 
public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such material, 
has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the 
public safety, or to jeopardize . . . the States’ “right . . . to maintain a 
decent society.”131 
The Court’s reference to “decent society,” although left unde-
fined, must be understood to fall outside moral concerns, given 
the earlier stress on the morally neutral nature of the obscenity 
law. 
The Court also identified several other interests that might 
legitimately support regulation of obscenity. In connection with 
public safety, for example, the Court pointed to reports of “an 
arguable correlation between obscene material and crime.”132 In 
addition, the Court noted the “social interest in order,”133 de-
scribing it as a concern with “antisocial behavior” that might 
flow from the “crass commercial exploitation of sex.”134 
The next major shift away from reliance on morals justifi-
cations came in 1991 in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.135 Although 
the Court in Barnes upheld an Indiana prohibition against nu-
dity as applied to a nude dancing establishment, there was no 
longer majority support for the proposition that a government 
interest in “protecting societal order and morality” sufficed.136 
 
 131. Id. (emphasis added) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 132. See id. at 58. In supporting the legitimacy of the safety and social or-
der concerns, the Court dedicated a portion of its opinion to supporting the 
state’s authority to embrace these concerns even absent empirical support for 
them. Id. at 60–64.  
 133. Id. at 61 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485, in turn quoting Chaplinsky, 
315 U.S. at 572).  
 134. Id. at 63.   
 135. 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
 136. A three-Justice plurality explained that public indecency laws, like 
the one at issue in Barnes, “reflect moral disapproval of people appearing in 
the nude among strangers in public places.” Id. at 568. It then concluded that 
the Indiana ban on nudity “further[ed] a substantial government interest in 
protecting order and morality.” Id. at 569. Justice Scalia opined that “[m]oral 
opposition to nudity suppl[ied] a rational basis for its prohibition.” Id. at 580 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
Earlier cases also sustained restrictions on adult entertainment theaters 
on nonmoral, secondary-effects grounds. However, the governments in those 
cases, unlike in Barnes, had not put the moral concerns in issue. See City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (observing that “the 
City Council’s ‘predominate concerns’ were with the secondary effects of adult 
theaters” (emphasis added)); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 
(1976) (analyzing the sufficiency of the city’s “interest in preserving the char-
acter of its neighborhoods,” including preventing “serious problems” of crime 
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Instead, Justice Souter, who provided the fifth vote to uphold 
the statute, disclaimed reliance on morals rationales. He rested 
his concurrence “not on the possible sufficiency of society’s 
moral views to justify the limitations at issue, but on the 
State’s substantial interest in combating the secondary effects 
of adult entertainment establishments.”137 Among the secon-
dary effects he cited were increases in prostitution, sexual as-
sault and “other criminal activity” that the state attributed to 
nude dancing.138 
Nearly a decade later, in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,139 a ma-
jority of the Court came around to Justice Souter’s position, 
disregarding morals rationales entirely while upholding a pub-
lic nudity restriction against a sex-related business under a 
statute that was practically identical to the statute at issue in 
Barnes.140 In evaluating the public indecency ordinance’s appli-
cation to a business that promoted “totally nude erotic dancing 
performed by women,”141 five of the seven Justices who voted to 
sustain the law did not even mention morality. Instead, they 
relied exclusively on the secondary effects of nude dancing,142 
accepting the city’s contention that “crime and other public 
health and safety problems are caused by the presence of nude 
dancing establishments.”143 
Although the city had, on its own initiative, advanced sec-
ondary-effects concerns to justify the zoning rule,144 this was not 
a situation where morality rationales were unimaginable or en-
tirely absent. The ordinance, after all, updated provisions of an 
 
caused by the concentration of adult entertainment businesses in the same 
neighborhood).  
 137. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 138. See id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 37, Barnes (No. 90-26)). 
 139. 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 140. See id. at 283–84 n.* (plurality opinion) (requiring otherwise nude 
dancers to wear pasties and g-strings); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569 n.2 (same). 
Justice Scalia noted specifically that “[t]he city of Erie self-consciously mod-
eled its ordinance on the public nudity statute” the Court upheld in Barnes. 
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 307 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 141. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 284 (plurality opinion). 
 142. See id. at 300–01 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 143. Id. at 300. 
 144. The ordinance’s preamble explained that the regulation was adopted 
because “nude live entertainment . . . adversely impacts and threatens to im-
pact on the public health, safety and welfare by providing an atmosphere con-
ducive to violence, sexual harassment, public intoxication, prostitution, the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases and other deleterious effects.” Id. at 
290 (citation omitted). 
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“‘Indecency and Immorality’ ordinance that ha[d] been on the 
books since 1866.”145 As a result, the majority’s departure from 
even partial rhetorical support for and reliance on morals-
related justifications sparked a sharp rebuke from Justice 
Scalia, who emphasized the continuing adequacy of morality as 
a sufficient basis for legislation. 
I do not feel the need, as the Court does, to identify some “secondary 
effects” associated with nude dancing that the city could properly seek 
to eliminate. (I am highly skeptical, to tell the truth, that the addition 
of pasties and G-strings will at all reduce the tendency of establish-
ments such as Kandyland to attract crime and prostitution, and hence 
to foster sexually transmitted disease.) The traditional power of gov-
ernment to foster good morals (bonos mores), and the acceptability of 
the traditional judgment (if Erie wishes to endorse it) that nude pub-
lic dancing itself is immoral, have not been repealed by the First 
Amendment.146 
As Justice Scalia himself acknowledged, the Court’s thinking 
about morals-based justifications had changed in kind.147 
Thus, although the Court consistently has sustained most 
adult entertainment restrictions, its jurisprudence in this area 
has undergone a dramatic analytic shift.148 As early as 1973, in 
 
 145. Id.; see also supra note 123 (discussing lawmakers’ commentary re-
garding immorality of nude dancing). 
 146. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 147. Justice Scalia emphasized this shift most recently in City of Los Ange-
les v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002), a case involving an ordinance 
prohibiting multiple adult entertainment businesses from locating in the same 
building. Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the plurality sustained the ordinance 
based on the city’s express interest in addressing the “higher rates of prostitu-
tion, robbery, assaults, and thefts” in communities where adult-oriented busi-
nesses are located. See id. at 430 (plurality opinion). Likewise, Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurrence focused entirely on the city planners’ power to regulate 
sexually-oriented businesses to reduce crime. Id. at 451–53 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). Justice Scalia, however, while joining the plurality, pointedly ob-
served that “in a case such as this our First Amendment traditions make ‘sec-
ondary effects’ analysis quite unnecessary. The Constitution does not prevent 
those communities that wish to do so from regulating, or indeed entirely sup-
pressing, the business of pandering sex.” Id. at 443–44 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 148. Compare Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of Newark, 354 U.S. 931 
(1957) (per curium) (affirming without discussion Adams Newark Theatre Co. 
v. City of Newark, 126 A.2d 340 (1956), and sustaining a ban on nude bur-
lesque productions where the city proffered morality justification), with Bar-
nes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582–83 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(introducing secondary-effects doctrine in this area), and City of Erie v. Pap’s 
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296–301 (2000) (plurality opinion) (outlining the plural-
ity’s analysis on a secondary-effects basis); and id. at 310 (Souter, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (stating his agreement with plurality’s 
analytic framework). See also James S. Malloy, Recent Decision, A Content 
Neutral Public Nudity Ordinance That Satisfies the O’Brien Test May Require 
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Paris Adult Theatre, the majority emphasized the law’s moral 
neutrality, even as it reinforced the permissibility of morals ra-
tionales to justify government action. Nearly twenty years later 
in Barnes, although the state’s power to rely on morality was 
touted by some of the Justices, a majority could not even be 
garnered to recognize the sufficiency of morals justifications. 
And now, after Erie, the Court has pushed morals rationales 
completely off the table in the context of adult entertainment, 
with the secondary-effects analysis embraced only by Justice 
Souter in Barnes having become the preferred analytic method 
for assessing the most recent round of restrictions on adult en-
tertainment.149 
2. Sexuality and Sexual Conduct 
The Court has likewise moved away from embracing mor-
als-based arguments as independently sufficient to justify other 
 
Erotic Dancers to Wear G-Strings and Pasties Without Violating Their First 
Amendment Right of Freedom of Expression: City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 39 
DUQ. L. REV. 705, 728 (2001) (noting that early “regulations on nude dancing 
were centered on social order and public morality” but that Pap’s A.M. “al-
low[ed] the justification to be the prevention of secondary effects such as 
crime, alcohol abuse, and prostitution”). 
 149. The Court also has focused largely on harmful material consequences 
in assessing regulation of child pornography. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747 (1982), the Court held that preventing “sexual exploitation and abuse of 
children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance” and ex-
plained in some detail the concrete harms that child subjects in pornographic 
materials might suffer. Id. at 757–60; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 
108–09, 111 (1990) (noting that “[t]he State does not rely on a paternalistic 
interest in regulating Osborne’s mind . . . [but instead] hopes to destroy a 
market for the exploitative use of children” while sustaining a prohibition 
against possession and viewing of child pornography). 
With respect to protecting children from adult-oriented pornography, the 
Court has also found “a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psy-
chological well-being of minors.” Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 
492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Notably, several of the most recent challenges to re-
strictions on sexual entertainment have not found this child-related interest 
sufficient to justify the measures at issue. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2001) (invalidating provisions of the Child Pornogra-
phy Prevention Act of 1996 notwithstanding Congress’s argument regarding 
consequential material harms to children); United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (rejecting the requirement that cable televi-
sion operators fully scramble or block channels offering sexually oriented pro-
gramming, even though the law’s aim was to protect children from exposure); 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down provisions of the Communi-
cations Decency Act of 1996 for violating the First Amendment notwithstand-
ing the concern that children might view sexually explicit material on the 
Internet). 
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restrictions related to sexuality. Most recently, of course, Law-
rence firmly repudiated the Court’s glib assertion in Bowers 
that morality sufficed as a legitimate government interest to 
justify Georgia’s sodomy law.150 Even before Lawrence, though, 
the Court began distancing itself from morals-based rationales 
for government action in this context. 
In Romer v. Evans,151 for example, the majority invalidated 
Colorado’s constitutional amendment prohibiting government 
entities from protecting lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals from 
discrimination, never once mentioning morality.152 Instead, in 
striking down the amendment, the Court focused entirely on 
the state’s freedom-of-association and conservation-of-resources 
arguments and concluded that no legitimate explanation could 
justify the breadth of the amendment’s prohibition.153 This 
complete disregard of possible morals justifications was par-
ticularly striking in the face of Justice Scalia’s dissent, which 
vigorously endorsed the moral authority of Coloradans to con-
demn homosexuality through the amendment at issue.154 The 
amendment could have been sufficiently and legitimately sup-
ported, Justice Scalia wrote, by “the same sort of moral disap-
proval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we 
held constitutional in Bowers.”155 
Of the relatively few additional cases in which the Court 
has considered sexuality-related restrictions,156 most have in-
 
 150. For additional discussion of Lawrence’s rejection of Bowers, see infra 
notes 191–96 and accompanying text. 
 151. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. at 635 (noting that the Court “cannot say that Amendment 2 is di-
rected to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective”). 
 154. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court “has no busi-
ness imposing upon all Americans the resolution . . . pronouncing that ‘ani-
mosity’ toward homosexuality . . . is evil” (internal citations omitted)). Justice 
Scalia added: “The Court today, announcing that Amendment 2 ‘defies . . . 
conventional [constitutional] inquiry,’ and ‘confounds [the] normal process of 
judicial review,’ employs a constitutional theory heretofore unknown to frus-
trate Colorado’s reasonable effort to preserve traditional American moral val-
ues.” Id. at 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
 155. Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 156. The Court has never directly considered the constitutionality of adul-
tery laws; the last time a majority of the Court implicitly endorsed adultery 
prohibitions was in Bowers. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195–96 
(1986) (noting the difficulty in “limit[ing] the claimed right to homosexual con-
duct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual 
crimes even though they are committed in the home”), overruled by Lawrence 
GOLDBERG.3FMT 4·18·2004  3:17 PM 
2004] MORALS-BASED LAWMAKING 1275 
 
volved a fundamental-rights analysis and have not even con-
sidered, much less relied upon, moral justifications.157 For ex-
ample, in Griswold v. Connecticut,158 the majority opinion con-
tained no mention of moral issues when it struck down 
Connecticut’s ban on the use of contraceptives by married cou-
 
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003); cf. S. Sur. Co. v. Oklahoma, 241 U.S. 582, 586 
(1916) (“Adultery is an offense against the marriage relation and belongs to 
the class of subjects which each State controls in its own way.”). 
The Court also has not directly analyzed the constitutionality of fornica-
tion laws, although majority opinions in several pre-Lawrence cases endorsed, 
in dicta, the constitutionality of prohibitions against fornication. See, e.g., 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973) (“[T]o say that our Con-
stitution incorporates the proposition that conduct involving consenting adults 
only is always beyond state regulation, is a step we are unable to take.”) (foot-
note omitted); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 193, 196 (1964) (appearing 
to accept as legitimate the government interests in “prevent[ing] breaches of 
the basic concepts of sexual decency,” including promiscuous sexual conduct, 
and “protect[ing] the integrity of the marriage laws of the State”). But see 
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977) (“We observe 
that the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question whether 
and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [sex-
ual] behavior among adults.”). Notwithstanding the dicta, Lawrence seems to 
have signaled the death knell for fornication laws as well as sodomy prohibi-
tions. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (stating that “[w]hen sexuality finds 
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be 
but one element in a [constitutionally protected] personal bond”). 
 157. For instance, in a case holding that organizers of a parade could not be 
required to permit a gay and lesbian group to march, the Court analyzed the 
case entirely on First Amendment grounds and never once considered moral 
disapproval as a possible justification for the exclusion of the gay organization. 
See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 
U.S. 557 (1995). 
In a different context, before the 1986 amendments to the Mann Act that 
removed the prohibition on transport “for any . . . immoral purpose,” see 18 
U.S.C. § 2421 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5(b), 100 Stat. 3511, 
several Mann Act cases concentrated on construing the term “immoral pur-
pose” rather than considering whether a claimed interest in morality, standing 
alone, could justify government action. However, as those cases evolved, the 
Supreme Court cut back on the broad meaning it had accorded to the Mann 
Act in the early part of the 1900s. See Amadio v. United States, 348 U.S. 892 
(1954) (per curiam) (reversing United States v. Amadio, 215 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 
1954) and ordering the district court to dismiss the indictment as outside the 
Mann Act’s purview in a case where the indictment for interstate transport for 
“immoral” purposes did not include prostitution). The Court’s summary rever-
sal in Amadio effectively overruled an earlier interpretation of the Mann Act 
in Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U.S. 326, 332–33 (1913) (holding that the 
Mann Act required only an intent to tempt a victim into a life of sexual im-
morality). See generally DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: 
LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE MANN ACT 213, 215–16, 238 (1994) (review-
ing the decline in prosecutions under the Mann Act for noncommercial im-
moral acts).  
 158. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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ples. Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,159 the Court ac-
knowledged the morality justification addressed by the lower 
court but then immediately sidestepped it, saying that “[w]e 
need not and do not . . . decide that important question in this 
case.”160 Likewise in Roe v. Wade,161 the Court acknowledged 
that individuals’ moral standards may shape personal views 
about abortion but did not once consider morality as a possibly 
sufficient justification for laws criminalizing abortion.162 In-
stead, the state interests acknowledged as important by the 
Court were “in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical 
standards, and in protecting potential life.”163 
3. Offensive Noncommercial Speech 
Although most contemporary cases in which morality 
might provide the sole justification for a law or policy concern 
sexual conduct or commercial depictions of sexuality, as illus-
trated above, a few cases decided outside that context merit at-
tention to illustrate further the Court’s reluctance to rely ex-
clusively on morals-based rationales. Perhaps most closely 
related to the cases just discussed are cases addressing the use 
of sexualized language in noncommercial settings, as they ar-
guably implicate the state’s interest in protecting constituents’ 
moral well-being. 
Two of these cases stand out. The first involved California’s 
effort to punish Paul Cohen for “‘maliciously and willfully dis-
turb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . 
by . . . offensive conduct,’” because Cohen wore his notorious 
“Fuck the Draft” jacket in the Los Angeles County court-
house.164 At issue in the case, the Court explained, was whether 
California could punish Cohen “upon a more general assertion 
that the States, acting as guardians of public morality, may 
properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabu-
lary.”165 Notwithstanding the widespread rhetorical reinforce-
ment of the government’s powers to do just that through the 
Court’s police powers jurisprudence, the Court did not treat 
 
 159. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 160. Id. at 452–53. 
 161. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 162. See id. at 153. 
 163. Id. at 154. 
 164. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (alterations in original) (ci-
tation omitted). 
 165. Id. at 22–23. 
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morality as sufficient to justify the government’s response to 
Cohen’s jacket. The Court recognized that the state’s interest in 
ridding public discourse of the “unseemly expletive” might seem 
reasonable but concluded that as distasteful as the word at is-
sue might be, the First and Fourteenth Amendment forbid cen-
sorship of it.166 
In the other significant noncommercial language use case, 
the Court spoke in the lofty terms of the schools’ responsibility 
to “teach by example the shared values of a civilized social or-
der,” but then upheld Matthew Fraser’s punishment for sexu-
ally suggestive speech during a high school assembly on harm-
based grounds rather than on a morals rationale.167 The major-
ity concentrated the bulk of its discussion on the school’s au-
thority to protect vulnerable youth from developmental harm,168 
rather than simply relying on the school’s authority to set a 
moral tone for the school.169 For example, the Court commented 
 
 166. See id. at 23–24 (stating that while “it is not so obvious that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments must be taken to disable the States from pun-
ishing public utterance of this unseemly expletive in order to maintain what 
they regard as a suitable level of discourse within the body politic . . . , that 
examination and reflection will reveal the shortcomings of a contrary view-
point” (footnote omitted)). 
 167. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 695–96 (1986). 
Fraser’s speech nominating a candidate for student body president contained 
an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.” Id. at 678. Although 
Justice Brennan concurred in the Court’s judgment, he distanced himself from 
the majority’s characterization of the speech, commenting that Fraser’s re-
marks were “no more ‘obscene,’ ‘lewd,’ or ‘sexually explicit’ than the bulk of 
programs currently appearing on prime time television or in the local cinema.” 
Id. at 689 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 168. The Court commented that its “First Amendment jurisprudence has 
acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in 
reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the 
audience may include children.” Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 684. For exam-
ple, the Court wrote, prior cases “recognize the obvious concern on the part of 
parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children—
especially in a captive audience—from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, 
or lewd speech.” Id. The Court also cited the recognized “interest in protecting 
minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language.” Id. “A high 
school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue di-
rected towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.” Id. at 685. 
 169. The Court acknowledged a point made earlier in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978), that certain utterances “‘are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’” Be-
thel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 685 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). However, it did not actually rely on morality in 
analyzing either the speech itself or the school’s authority to punish the 
speech giver. Id.  
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that “[t]he speech could well be seriously damaging to its less 
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on 
the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.”170 Indeed, the 
Court seemed troubled less by moral issues and more by misin-
formation about sexuality that younger students might absorb. 
“Some students,” the Court noted, “were reported as bewildered 
by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it provoked.”171 The 
Court also stressed the particular harm it believed the speech 
caused to the young women in the audience: “By glorifying 
male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was 
acutely insulting to teenage girl students.”172 This sort of harm, 
rather than a morals-based concern, appears to have prompted 
the Court’s conclusion that “[t]he schools, as instruments of the 
state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature 
conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, in-
decent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged 
in by this confused boy.” 173 
4. Sunday Closure Laws and Family Law 
Cases involving Sunday closure laws, which fall even fur-
ther outside the realm of sexuality regulation, also illustrate 
the steady coupling of morals justifications with other bases for 
government action. In an early opinion to address this type of 
law, the Court in Hennington v. Georgia174 upheld a law prohib-
iting freight trains from operating on the Sabbath.175 Even in 
that case, while recognizing the state’s interest in its constitu-
ents’ morality, the Court acknowledged that the restriction also 
fell within the legislature’s power to promote the public’s wel-
fare.176 It characterized the law, which was challenged not as an 
 
 170. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 683. 
 171. Id. at 683–84. 
 172. Id. at 683. Again, Justice Brennan disagreed with the Court’s charac-
terization of the harm. He wrote: 
There is no evidence in the record that any students, male or female, 
found the speech “insulting.” And while it was not unreasonable for 
school officials to conclude that respondent’s remarks were inappro-
priate for a school-sponsored assembly, the language respondent used 
does not even approach the sexually explicit speech regulated in 
Ginsberg v. New York, or the indecent speech banned in FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation. 
Id. at 689 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 173. See id. at 683. 
 174. 163 U.S. 299 (1896). 
 175. Id. at 318. 
 176. See id. at 304. 
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establishment of religion but rather as an impermissible inter-
ference with interstate commerce, as “an ordinary police regu-
lation established by the State under its general power to pro-
tect the health and morals, and to promote the welfare, of its 
people.”177 
When the Court decided McGowan v. Maryland178 and 
three related cases,179 it again focused on justifications other 
than morality to sustain the Sunday closure laws.180 But unlike 
in Hennington, its holding in these Establishment Clause cases 
did not even mention morality as a potential rationale. Al-
though the Court cited two lower court opinions that mentioned 
morality in the course of analyzing the religious roots of Sun-
day closure laws,181 morality ultimately played no explicit role 
in the Court’s decision to sustain the Maryland law at issue in 
McGowan. Rather than focusing on the moral value of limiting 
Sunday activities embraced in earlier rulings, the Court 
stressed the variety of activities, including non-charitable 
events, permitted on Sunday182 and the absence of rules requir-
ing special comportment during the officially sanctioned day of 
 
 177. Id. at 302. 
 178. 366 U.S. 420 (1960). 
 179. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Ko-
sher Supermarket of Mass., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-
Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). 
 180. See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. at 433–34 (“[D]espite the strongly reli-
gious origin of these laws, beginning before the eighteenth century, nonreli-
gious arguments for Sunday closing began to be heard more distinctly and the 
statutes began to lose some of their totally religious flavor.”). 
 181. See id. at 436–37 (observing that a once-a-week closure law was “‘a 
rule of conduct, which the entire civilized world recognizes as essential to the 
physical and moral well-being of society’”) (quoting Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 
502 (1858) (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 449 (stating that the Sunday closure 
law was analogous to a police power action concerned with “‘public health, 
morals and safety’” but actually derived from the government’s power to pro-
tect “‘the peace, order, and quiet of the community’”) (quoting Hiller v. Mary-
land, 92 A. 842, 844 (1914)). 
 182. Id. at 424. The Court wrote: 
[W]e find that [the law at issue] permits the Sunday sale of tobaccos 
and sweets and a long list of sundry articles which we have enumer-
ated above; we find that [a related provision] permits the Sunday op-
eration of bathing beaches, amusement parks and similar facilities; 
we find that [another provision] permits the Sunday sale of alcoholic 
beverages, products strictly forbidden by predecessor statutes; we are 
told that Anne Arundel County allows Sunday bingo and the Sunday 
playing of pinball machines and slot machines, activities generally 
condemned by prior Maryland Sunday legislation. Certainly, these 
are not works of charity or necessity. 
Id. at 448. 
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rest.183 It then upheld the laws at issue as being legitimately 
concerned with “improvement of the health, safety, recreation 
and general well-being of our citizens.”184 
Finally, although few family law cases are decided at the 
Supreme Court level and none has been decided in recent dec-
ades that engaged directly with morals-based justifications for 
government action, trends in this area of the law bear noting 
because they echo the view that courts have become increas-
ingly ill at ease with morality-based decision making. In an ex-
tensive study of the changing role of moral discourse in family 
law, Professor Carl Schneider observed “a diminution of the 
law’s discourse in moral terms about the relations between 
family members.”185 According to Professor Schneider, this 
trend precipitated a “transfer of many moral decisions from the 
law to the people the law once regulated.”186 To take just one 
example, in the child custody context, courts have increasingly 
shifted toward a nexus test that requires a showing of actual 
harm to a child rather than presuming harm based on parental 
conduct or identities traditionally viewed as immoral.187 For in-
 
 183. The Court added that “[t]hese provisions . . . seem clearly to be fash-
ioned for the purpose of providing a Sunday atmosphere of recreation, cheer-
fulness, repose and enjoyment. Coupled with the general proscription against 
other types of work, we believe that the air of the day is one of relaxation.” Id. 
at 448. Further still, the Court observed that the statute “does talk in terms of 
‘profan[ing] the Lord’s day,’ but other sections permit the activities previously 
thought to be profane. Prior denunciation of Sunday drunkenness is now gone. 
Contemporary concern with these statutes is evidenced by the dozen changes 
made in 1959 and by the recent enactment of a majority of the exceptions.” Id. 
at 448–49 (alteration in original). 
Of course, the deliberately nonmoral focus of the Court’s opinion also 
served to reinforce the Court’s ultimate conclusion that the laws were not reli-
gious in nature. Id. at 444 (“In light of the evolution of our Sunday Closing 
Laws . . . , it is not difficult to discern that as presently written and adminis-
tered, most of them, at least, are of a secular rather than of a religious charac-
ter.”). 
 184. Id. at 444. The Court added: 
Numerous laws affecting public health, safety factors in industry, 
laws affecting hours and conditions of labor of women and children, 
week-end diversion at parks and beaches, and cultural activities of 
various kinds, now point the way toward the good life for all. Sunday 
Closing Laws, like those before us, have become part and parcel of 
this great governmental concern wholly apart from their original pur-
poses or connotations.  
Id. at 444–45.  
 185. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of Ameri-
can Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (1985).  
 186. Id. at 1808. 
 187. James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State 
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stance, where lesbian and gay parents in the past were rou-
tinely denied custody or visitation on the grounds that their 
sexual orientation was presumed to endanger their child’s 
moral development, most states no longer permit such categori-
cally negative presumptions.188 Similar examples of the shift 
away from morals-based analysis to consideration only of con-
crete harms proliferate in other types of custody disputes as 
well as in the areas of divorce and alimony.189 
5. Lawrence and Morality  
This pervasive reluctance to rely on morals rationales fi-
nally came to a head in Lawrence, where the Court had no 
choice but to consider the state’s interest in morality since it 
was Texas’s leading rationale for its Homosexual Conduct 
Law.190 Yet, even there, rather than elaborate on the morality 
component of the state’s police power, the Court barely ana-
lyzed the proffered morals justification. The majority opinion 
mentioned moral concerns only five times and two of those 
mentions came in descriptions of Bowers.191 The other three ref-
 
Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 
925 (2003) (describing the nexus test as the “prevailing rule”). 
 188. See, e.g., Patricia M. Logue, The Rights of Lesbian and Gay Parents 
and Their Children, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 95, 102 (2002).  
[P]arental sexual orientation alone is not a basis upon which visita-
tion is denied. And, in recent years, even states generally considered 
most socially conservative on issues of homosexuality and parenting 
have disclaimed any per se rule restricting custody for lesbian or gay 
parents on the basis of sexual orientation alone. This trend is consis-
tent with the generally accepted focus in custody matters on the cir-
cumstances and best interests of individual children. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  
This is not to suggest that lesbian and gay parents are always considered 
on equal footing with nongay parents but rather that the dominant trend has 
been against imposing negative categorical presumptions on account of a par-
ent’s sexual orientation. See Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Com-
mitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1188 (1999). 
 189. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 188; Schneider, supra note 185. 
 190. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“Texas attempts to justify its law, and the effects of the law, by 
arguing that the statute satisfies rational basis review because it furthers the 
legitimate government interest of the promotion of morality.”); cf. supra note 
34 (discussing a family values rationale also proffered to support the Texas 
statute). 
 191. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (“It must be acknowledged, of course, 
that the Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries 
there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as im-
moral.”); see also id. (quoting Bowers’s observation that “Judeao-Christian 
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erences tellingly reinforce what we already know about the 
Court’s disinclination to engage with morals-based arguments. 
First, immediately after acknowledging the deep-rooted 
“moral principles” that shape many people’s views about homo-
sexuality, the Court asked “whether the majority may use the 
power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society 
through operation of the criminal law.”192 The Court then im-
mediately elided its question about the sufficiency of majori-
tarian moral views and commented instead on its own moral 
authority: “‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to 
mandate our own moral code.’”193 
Toward the opinion’s end, the Court finally returned to the 
question whether government may act on morals rationales. 
But even there, the Court seemed to resist a direct statement of 
its views on the viability of morals rationales. Instead, without 
paraphrasing or offering additional comment, it adopted, via 
quotation, Justice Stevens’s dissenting analysis from Bowers: 
“‘[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has tradi-
tionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a suffi-
cient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.’”194 
However, even Justice Stevens’s approach does not answer 
fully the question whether Texas’s morals justification was in-
adequate. Morality, after all, is not necessarily limited to tradi-
tional majoritarian views. Conceivably, some other source, such 
as moral disapproval of homosexuality derived via a natural 
law approach,195 could have informed the morality rationale. 
Yet the Court did not address that possibility or even mention 
morality again. Instead, after reviewing the facts of the case, 
the Court simply noted that “[t]he Texas statute furthers no le-
gitimate state interest.”196 
To the extent actions actually do speak louder than words, 
the Court’s consistent disinclination to rely on, or even respond 
to, morals rationales for lawmaking tells us that the days in 
which mere reference to morality could justify government ac-
tion are long over, if indeed they ever existed outside of Bowers. 
Yet we are left, still, with the question of why the Court would 
 
moral and ethical standards” concern “homosexual conduct”).  
 192. Id. at 2480. 
 193. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
 194. Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(footnotes and citations omitted)). 
 195. See generally Finnis, supra note 9. 
 196. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. 
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balk at accepting the very justifications celebrated by its own 
rhetoric. The next part takes on that question and develops two 
interrelated explanations for the Court’s avoidance of explicit 
morals rationales. These theories not only illuminate some of 
the challenges presented by morals-based lawmaking but also 
reinforce the inevitability of the explicit morals rationale’s de-
mise. 
III.  THEORIZING THE COURT’S MORAL DISCOMFORT 
Out of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence come two expla-
nations for why the Court has shied away from morals justifi-
cations in the past. The first, which I call the majoritarian im-
pulse theory, highlights the flaws inherent in the Bowers-type 
reasoning that laws can be deemed to serve moral interests by 
virtue of having been popularly enacted. As I explain below, 
this majoritarian argument is impermissibly circular at worst 
and foreclosed by the Court’s analysis of history and tradition 
at best. 
The second, more powerful theory concerns institutional 
competence. Specifically, I argue that if a court does not em-
brace the majoritarian articulation of moral interests, it may 
appear to be rejecting the majority’s views in favor of judges’ 
personal preferences for a competing vision of the moral good. 
How are judges to select plausibly among many diverse moral 
frameworks other than by relying on their personal prefer-
ences? Given the diversity of moral visions held by Americans, 
as highlighted by the Court’s increased engagement in the last 
half-century with the pluralistic nature of American society, it 
is extremely difficult, and perhaps not possible, for a court 
credibly to adopt the analytic framework necessary to distin-
guish between legitimate and impermissible majoritarian invo-
cations of morality to justify government action.197 
 
 197. Not only has disagreement increased about the morality of particular 
forms of conduct but there has also been increasing respect for autonomy. See, 
e.g., id. at 2480 (describing “an emerging awareness that liberty gives sub-
stantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private 
lives in matters pertaining to sex”). Since autonomy also could be character-
ized as a moral value, the Court’s avoidance of morals rationales conceivably 
could be interpreted as reflecting a judicial shift to a new moral autonomy 
theory rather than as reflecting a deficiency of morality as an independent jus-
tification for lawmaking. If this shift has occurred, it may be that the difficulty 
of evaluating morals rationales accounts for the change. Still, persistent rhe-
torical embrace of the government’s authority to promote constituents’ moral-
ity coupled with the Court’s long-standing reluctance to rely exclusively on ex-
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Taken together, these two theories confirm that the Court’s 
avoidance of morals rationales as the exclusive justifications for 
government action is not only reasonable but also necessary for 
institutional self-preservation. 
A. THE CIRCULARITY OF THE MAJORITARIAN IMPULSE 
ARGUMENT 
Because Bowers v. Hardwick is the only contemporary case 
to sustain a challenged law based explicitly on a pure morals 
justification, the Court’s opinion offers a useful starting point 
for analyzing the claim that majority approval itself demon-
strates the existence of a legally sufficient morals rationale. As 
we will see below, whether we take the simplest version of that 
argument and assume that all laws reflect moral positions or a 
more nuanced version and treat only certain laws as reflecting 
moral positions based on their long-standing or widespread 
popular approval, the analysis does not encourage resuscitation 
of reliance on morals-based justifications. 
To take the simplest point first, let us consider how the 
Court knew in Bowers that Georgians considered “homosexual 
sodomy” to be “immoral and unacceptable.”198 No evidence had 
been admitted regarding Georgia voters’ views.199 Only the text 
of the statute was before the Court, and that text mentioned 
only the prohibited acts.200 Yet from that information, the Court 
“presumed” that Georgians had enacted into law their moral 
disapproval of homosexuality.201 
 
plicit morals justifications suggests that the adoption of a new judicial moral 
theory, even if contemplated, is far from complete. Other recent decisions, in-
cluding the Court’s rejection of the right-to-die law at issue in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and its acceptance of limitations on a 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 
U.S. at 833, suggest that moral autonomy has not become the Court’s guiding 
value but instead remains only one value among many competing for the 
Court’s commitment. 
 198. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 219. 
 199. The case was originally dismissed by the district court for failure to 
state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186. 
 200. The statute provided: 
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or 
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and 
the mouth or anus of another. . . . 
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. . . . 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). 
 201. The Georgia Attorney General reinforced this point in his opening 
brief, arguing that “[i]f morality is a legitimate state purpose, the identifica-
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In other words, the majority relied on the fact of the law’s 
passage to establish moral disapproval of acts the law pro-
scribed, and then relied on that moral disapproval to justify the 
law’s proscription of the acts. Or, put more simply, the Court 
found that the law’s passage justified a presumption that in 
turn justified the law’s passage. This equation of law with 
moral judgment seems to be what Justice White intended by 
his comment that “[t]he law . . . is constantly based on notions 
of morality” and that “if all laws representing essentially moral 
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the 
courts will be very busy indeed.”202 
Perhaps needless to say, especially in light of Lawrence 
and the extensive literature critiquing the Bowers majority 
opinion,203 the Court’s reasoning is, at least at first glance, cir-
cular and unpersuasive. If a law’s enactment is sufficient to 
demonstrate moral views and if moral views are enough to sus-
tain a law, then all laws would have to be sustained. The ma-
joritarian impulse thus functions as a justification that swal-
lows the entire analysis; judicial review becomes a pointless 
exercise because every enacted law would bring with it a mor-
als-based justification. If all laws reflect morality, why bother 
with judicial oversight? 
Further, even at the time Bowers was decided, the Court 
had already rejected this self-justifying view that popular ap-
proval alone could insulate a law from legal challenge. In City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,204 for example, the Court 
affirmed that “[i]t is plain that the electorate as a whole, 
whether by referendum or otherwise, could not order city action 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause and the City may not 
avoid the strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or 
 
tion of that morality, ‘the widely held values’ of the people, should be voiced 
through their representatives.” Petitioner’s Brief, Bowers (No. 85-140), 1985 
WL 776939, at *36. 
As discussed above, the presumption regarding Georgians’ views about 
homosexuality was factually inappropriate since the law did not single out 
sexual acts between same-sex partners but instead prohibited anyone, regard-
less of sexual orientation, from engaging in the proscribed forms of contact. 
See supra note 78. 
 202. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. 
 203. See, e.g., Janet Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in 
and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); Nan Hunter, Life 
After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992); Jed Rubenfeld, The 
Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) (discussing additional critiques of Bowers). 
 204. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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objections of some fraction of the body politic.”205 Likewise, in 
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly,206 the Court opined 
that “[a] citizen’s constitutional rights can hardly be infringed 
simply because a majority of the people choose that it be.”207 
Perhaps, then, Justice White meant that the presumption 
of a legally sufficient morals justification would arise not from 
mere passage of a law but rather from a long-standing or wide-
spread tradition supporting a prohibition. After all, both his-
torically and at the time Bowers was decided, many other 
states had in place sodomy laws similar to Georgia’s.208 Chief 
Justice Burger’s concurrence further supports the salience of 
history to the analysis by its reference to ancient proscriptions 
against same-sex couples’ sexual intimacy.209 This focus on the 
quality and quantity of support for a position would have the 
effect of closing the morals floodgates to some degree, since not 
all laws have long chronological or broad geographic pedigrees. 
However, recharacterizing the existence of long-standing 
prohibitions under the rubric of tradition, history, or broad 
geographic support does not help the argument much. Mirror-
ing its view that majoritarian approval alone cannot justify 
government action, the Court also has affirmed that “[s]tanding 
alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary viola-
tions of constitutional guarantees.”210 Likewise, the existence of 
 
 205. Id. at 448 (citation omitted).  
 206. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
 207. Id. at 736–37. 
 208. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 n.5, 193 n.6 (1986) (refer-
encing current and past laws criminalizing “sodomy”), overruled by Lawrence, 
123 S. Ct. 2472. As the Lawrence majority observed in reviewing Bowers’s ob-
servations about the history of sodomy laws, “[t]heir historical premises are 
not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.” Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 
at 2480. 
 209. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he proscrip-
tions against sodomy have very ‘ancient roots.’ Decisions of individuals relat-
ing to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout 
the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly 
rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.”). 
 210. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (emphasis added). The 
Court has made this point repeatedly. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (“‘[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor the 
fact of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through the centuries 
insulates it from constitutional attack . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970))); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 210 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that either the 
length of time a majority has held its convictions or the passions with which it 
defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court’s scrutiny.”) (citing Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472; Payton 
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similar laws in other jurisdictions may illustrate broad majori-
tarian support for the challenged action, but the fact of majori-
tarian support, again, cannot itself suffice to justify a law 
unless judicial review is to be rendered virtually meaningless.211 
In sum, presuming moral disapproval based on the passage 
of a law, as was suggested by the majority opinion in Bowers, 
does not provide a means for distinguishing laws that warrant 
the presumption of a legitimate and sufficient morals justifica-
tion from those that do not. Indeed, the majoritarian impulse 
argument embraced in Bowers actually may have reinforced 
the Court’s distaste for morals-based claims precisely because 
it precludes the effective screening of morals justifications that 
is required for meaningful judicial review. 
B. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE, PLURALISM, AND THE 
INADEQUACY OF THE MORAL CODE 
The remainder of this part considers whether a court could 
simply rely on the “traditional power of government to foster 
 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600 (1980) (“A longstanding, widespread practice is 
not immune from constitutional scrutiny.”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 
664, 678 (1970) (“It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or pro-
tected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span 
of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it.”); Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546–47 (1969) (“That an unconstitutional action 
has been taken before surely does not render that same action any less uncon-
stitutional at a later date.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating 
antimiscegenation law despite long tradition of prohibitions against interra-
cial marriage); Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting school seg-
regation by race despite extensive tradition of and support for racially segre-
gated public education); see also Justice Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 
HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (“It is revolting to have no better reason for a 
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still 
more revolting if [its foundation has] vanished long since, and the rule simply 
persists from blind imitation of the past.”). But see Burnham v. Superior 
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“The short of the matter is 
that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process be-
cause it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system.”). 
 211. In striking down a Virginia law that permitted execution of people 
with mental retardation, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 
(2002), observed that national legislative trends provide the “clearest and most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.” Id. at 311–12 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). This reference to national trends as a re-
source for identifying contemporary values implicated in the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment reinforces the sali-
ence of widespread support or disapproval for a particular provision but does 
not contravene the Court’s regular observation, see supra note 210 and accom-
panying text, that trends alone do not suffice to justify government action.  
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good morals (bonos mores)”212 rather than looking to majori-
tarian approval to provide moral grounding for government ac-
tion. The difficulty with this position, as will be developed be-
low, is that absent an authoritative source of bonos mores, 
judges necessarily bring to bear their own moral positions any 
time they review the legal sufficiency of a morals-based ration-
ale. Although numerous scholars have long recognized that all 
adjudication is affected, at some level, by individual judges’ life 
experiences and philosophical stances,213 the possibility that 
judges might displace legislative views on community morality 
with their own brings the countermajoritarian difficulty to new 
heights.214 
The risk that judges would appear to be imposing their 
own views when they purport to be applying a definitive, au-
thoritative moral framework has become especially apparent 
since World War II, with a surfeit of cases before the Supreme 
Court highlighting the multiplicity of moral views among the 
American public.215 As these cases illustrate, the American pub-
 
 212. See Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). 
 213. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (elaborating on their 
political science research, which suggests that judicial outcomes are based 
primarily on the personal ideologies of judges); Howard Gillman, What’s Law 
Got To Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial 
Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 466 (2001) (commenting on 
“decades of social science research . . . [that] ha[ve] demonstrated . . . that 
ideological and political considerations drive decision making”); James E. 
Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegrega-
tion Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1677 (2003) (“[I]t seems fair to say that nei-
ther social scientists nor law professors would argue that personal preference 
and ideology never influence the outcome of a case. The disagreement concerns 
the magnitude of and occasions for this influence—not its existence.”); Richard 
A. Posner, Appeal and Consent, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 1999, at 36, 37 
(“Where the Constitution is unclear, judicial review is likely to be guided by 
the political prejudices and the policy preferences of the judges rather than by 
the Constitution itself.”).  
 214. See generally BICKEL, supra note 14 (analyzing the countermajori-
tarian exercise of power by courts); cf. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1517 (“After 
moral discourse is over, even if some parties remain unconvinced, the prevail-
ing party’s moral beliefs attain the force and effect of law. That is why politics 
is so scary.”); Barbara J. Flagg, Comment, “Animus” and Moral Disapproval: A 
Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82 MINN. L. REV. 833, 851 (1998) (“State action 
undertaken for moral reasons alone is the antithesis of pluralism; it evinces no 
respect for the moral understanding or norms of those whom it situates as 
outsiders.”). 
 215. See infra notes 254–77 and accompanying text (discussing cases that 
illustrate the multiplicity of moral views among the American public). 
GOLDBERG.3FMT 4·18·2004  3:17 PM 
2004] MORALS-BASED LAWMAKING 1289 
 
lic does not share a single, coherent vision to which courts 
might turn when evaluating a morals rationale.216 Further, 
even the experts in this area—moral philosophers—cannot 
agree on what constitutes “good morals.”217 Whatever credibility 
the Court might have possessed previously to announce moral 
consensus on particular issues has slipped away entirely.218 
Consequently, a court asked to assess a morals justification 
winds up either deferring to the majority’s representation of 
morality or bringing to the analysis the moral vision it prefers. 
The lack of an authoritative alternative to majoritarian prefer-
ences that could enable meaningful, objective assessment of 
proposed moral justifications has reinforced, in turn, the 
Court’s disinclination to rely on morality-based justifications.219  
The discussion here will proceed by first fleshing out ar-
guments for the sufficiency of morals-based arguments as they 
have been framed by the Court and an assortment of moral phi-
losophers. I will then turn to the post–World War II cases to il-
lustrate how the multiplicity of moral views in those cases has 
heightened the challenge for courts charged with sorting out 
legitimate moral expressions from impermissible prejudices. 
1. Judicial Development of the Morality-Based Justification 
As the leading advocate of moral code–based arguments on 
the Court today, Justice Scalia has contended strenuously that 
moral views, standing alone, should suffice to justify govern-
ment action.220 Although his opinions do not elaborate how gov-
ernment should determine that particular forms of conduct are 
immoral, he has expressed absolute faith in government’s au-
thority to reinforce “traditional judgment[s].”221 In Pap’s A.M., 
 
 216. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2314 
(1997) (discussing “conflicting views about morality” in democratic societies). 
 217. See infra notes 228–53 and accompanying text. 
 218. As Judge Posner has observed, “there are no techniques for forging 
consensus on the premises of moral inquiry and the means of deriving and 
testing specific moral propositions.” POSNER, supra note 9, at 63. 
 219. Cf. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1517 (explaining that “the political 
community” is “heterogeneous,” that “it is better, insofar as possible, to agree 
to disagree, especially about the highest things,” and that “the Constitution 
itself . . . forbids the government from even attempting to iron out our differ-
ences with respect to the highest things”). 
 220. See, e.g., Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., con-
curring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644–48 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 221. See, e.g., Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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for example, he stated without citation that “the acceptability 
of the traditional judgment . . . that nude public dancing itself 
is immoral” should suffice to uphold a zoning restriction im-
posed on an adult entertainment establishment.222 Likewise, 
according to Justice Scalia, “[m]oral opposition to homosexual-
ity” properly sufficed to justify the sodomy law in Bowers.223 
“Moral opposition to nudity supplie[d] a rational basis for its 
prohibition” in Barnes in Justice Scalia’s view, as well.224 
Although Chief Justice Burger provided even less elabora-
tion, his concurrence in Bowers similarly endorsed the propri-
ety of government action based on moral positions. In rejecting 
Michael Hardwick’s challenge to Georgia’s sodomy law, he ac-
cused Hardwick of seeking to have the Court “cast aside mil-
lennia of moral teaching.”225 
Thus, to the extent the positions of Justice Scalia and Chief 
Justice Burger hold themselves out as relying on something 
more than a compilation of popular dislikes,226 they assume 
that an authoritative moral code can be ascertained and ap-
plied by courts. Professor Gerard Bradley, an advocate for the 
natural law position, found some hints of this in Chief Justice 
Burger’s Bowers concurrence as opposed to Justice White’s ma-
joritarian impulse argument. He observed that “[t]he closest 
any of the Bowers conservatives came to a simple statement 
that sodomy is immoral was Chief Justice Burger’s concurring 
observation that ‘[c]ondemnation of those practices is firmly 
rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards.’”227 Jus-
 
 222. Id.  
 223. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 580 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). Perhaps given 
his view of the teachings’ nearly infinite existence, Chief Justice Burger did 
not explain what qualified the teachings as not merely long-standing but also 
distinctly moral. Or perhaps he thought his reference to long-standing laws 
and a portion of Blackstone’s Commentaries had given the teachings the qual-
ity of being moral as opposed to simply popular. Although the Chief Justice 
openly endorsed Judeao-Christian ethics as part of his analysis, we can pre-
sume even he would not have considered his citation to a book about Western 
Christianity and homosexuality as sufficient support for a nonsectarian mor-
als-based justification for Georgia’s law. See id. at 196–97. 
 226. The positions are arguably different, with Justice Scalia placing 
greater emphasis on popular taste, see Barnes, 501 U.S. at 580, and Chief Jus-
tice Burger seeking to attach his analysis to a set of views outside the whims 
of the majority, see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197.  
 227. Gerard V. Bradley, Pluralistic Perfectionism: A Review Essay of Mak-
ing Men Moral, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 675 (1996) (reviewing ROBERT P. 
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tice Scalia, however, for all of his defense of morals-based law-
making, has not indicated how the code would be discerned be-
yond looking to the long-standing and widespread nature of 
particular prohibitions. 
2. Moral Philosophers on Morals-Based Rationales for 
Government Action 
Supplementing the Court’s efforts to stake out (or avoid) a 
moral position have been moral philosophers devoted to defin-
ing the morality that governments should effectuate. Although 
Richard Posner has argued categorically that the work of moral 
philosophers is a “useless endeavor,”228 a brief review here of 
several diverse philosophical positions regarding governmental 
reliance on morality aims to illustrate a smaller point. That is, 
simply, that the philosophers, through their diverse, highly de-
veloped views, reinforce the difficulty for courts that would de-
clare as correct one particular version of morality. 
Among the leading advocates for governmental reliance on 
a particularized moral code have been natural law adherents 
advancing the perfectionist view that the law should function 
not only to prevent harm but also to “help people to establish 
and preserve a virtuous character.”229 A central premise of the 
natural law position is that universally valid basic human 
goods can be identified and that the law, including morals-
based laws, should enable people to realize those goods.230 As 
Robert George has explained, these goods involve “integral hu-
 
GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 
(1993)). 
 228. POSNER, supra note 9, at 17. 
 229. GEORGE, supra note 9, at 1. Specifically, Professor George contended, 
laws prohibiting “certain powerfully seductive and corrupting vices (some sex-
ual, some not)” can encourage virtue by: 
(1) preventing the (further) self-corruption which follows from acting 
out a choice to indulge in immoral conduct; 
(2) preventing the bad example by which others are induced to emu-
late such behavior; 
(3) helping to preserve the moral ecology in which people make their 
morally self-constituting choices; and 
(4) educating people about moral right and wrong. 
Id. 
 230. See generally id.; Bradley, supra note 227; Finnis, supra note 9. Kent 
Greenawalt has summarized the natural law position as holding that “human 
law is in some sense derived from moral norms that are universally valid and 
discoverable by reasoning about human nature or true human goods.” KENT 
GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 161 (1987). 
GOLDBERG.3FMT 4·18·2004  3:17 PM 
1292 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:1233 
 
man well-being and fulfillment” and are not “means to human 
flourishing” but rather “they are constitutive aspects of the per-
sons whom they fulfill.”231 
Professor George and others have applied these theoretical 
approaches to reach more specific moral positions on a variety 
of issues, including the conduct that was at issue in Lawrence—
sexual relations between same-sex partners. George and John 
Finnis, another leading natural law scholar, for example, both 
served as expert witnesses in Romer v. Evans,232 where they 
sought to establish the immorality of same-sex sexual relations 
to help defend a state constitutional amendment forbidding 
government entities from prohibiting discrimination against 
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.233 Professor Finnis argued, in 
particular, that “‘homosexual acts’ are ‘morally bad’ because 
‘genital activity between same-sex partners cannot actualize or 
allow them to really experience any common good to which they 
are jointly committed.’”234 Likewise, Professor Bradley has 
opined that “[l]aws prohibiting ‘victimless’ sexual immoralities 
typically proceed from the conviction that the acts are truly 
wrong, that they really damage the characters of the persons 
who perform them, and that they block the path of those per-
sons to virtue, and in specific ways offend against the common 
good.”235 
Harry Clor, another moralist who has advocated govern-
mental reliance on a specific moral code, has argued that law-
makers should concern themselves less with the virtuous char-
acter of individuals and more with the worthiness of the 
community. Public morality, he wrote, “means that in principle 
the civic community has a legitimate interest in discouraging 
some ways of life and encouraging others.”236 In particular, he 
would have morals-based lawmaking “support the efforts of 
citizens to sustain a cultural milieu that reflects shared stan-
 
 231. GEORGE, supra note 9, at 13–14. Professor George has elaborated that 
the “complete” basic human good is “integral human well-being and fulfill-
ment.” Id. at 13. This good, in turn, is comprised of “life (in a broad sense that 
includes health and vitality); knowledge; play; aesthetic experience; sociability 
(i.e. friendship broadly conceived); practical reasonableness; and religion.” Id. 
 232. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 233. LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY 
PEOPLE ON TRIAL 162, 166 (1998). 
 234. Id. at 162 (citation omitted). 
 235. Bradley, supra note 227, at 676. 
 236. CLOR, supra note 4, at 103. 
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dards of civility and decency,”237 and described those standards, 
in turn, as implicating “notions of what is humanly respectable 
(or degrading) conduct and what is a civilized mode of life.”238 
According to Professor Clor, prohibitions on pornography, 
for example, are important not to prevent any material harms 
that might occur to the actors or others but instead to guard 
against “debasement of character.”239 “[S]tandards supportive of 
monogamous family life” similarly “support certain important 
human qualities or standards of value,” he contended.240 
Other moral philosophers also accept government’s role in 
reinforcing morality but maintain that government should pri-
oritize a different moral good. Liberal perfectionists, for exam-
ple, agree with natural law scholars that government has a re-
sponsibility to assist people in doing good but take a different 
view of how that good should be realized. Joseph Raz, for ex-
ample, has argued that “[a]utonomy is a constituent element of 
the good life.”241 From that, he concluded that while “it is the 
function of government to promote morality,”242 it is also impor-
tant that “within bounds, respect for personal autonomy re-
quires tolerating bad or evil actions.”243 Otherwise, his argu-
ment goes, the government potentially could risk enacting 
undue restrictions on individual autonomy. According to Raz, 
“there is no practical way of ensuring that the coercion [to 
make morally acceptable choices] will restrict the victims’ 
choice of repugnant options but will not interfere with their 
other choices.”244 
Like Professor Raz, Ronald Dworkin has also advocated 
minimal government interference with individual decision 
making, growing in part from his commitment to “equal con-
cern and respect,”245 which engenders a “right to moral inde-
pendence.”246 He has instructed that “[a] conscientious legisla-
 
 237. Id. at 226. 
 238. Id. at 14. Clor elaborated that this ethic “is associated . . . with judg-
ments about the worthy and the unworthy—and ultimately with ideas of the 
good and the appropriate for human beings.” Id.  
 239. Id. at 226. 
 240. Id. at 17. 
 241. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 408 (1986).  
 242. Id. at 415. 
 243. Id. at 403–04. 
 244. Id. at 419. 
 245. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180–83 (1977). 
 246. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 353 (1985); cf. William A. 
Galston, The Legal and Political Implications of Moral Pluralism, 57 MD. L. 
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tor who is told a moral consensus exists must test the creden-
tials of that consensus” because “the principles of democracy we 
follow do not call for the enforcement of the consensus, for the 
belief that prejudices, personal aversions and rationalizations 
do not justify restricting another’s freedom itself occupies a 
critical and fundamental position in our popular morality.”247 
Without adequate screening, which is difficult to achieve,248 this 
equality right is put at risk. 
Others, such as David Richards, have expressed less con-
cern with the state’s authority to instill morality and more con-
cern with the substantive moral conclusion of many natural 
law advocates that consensual sexual activity between unmar-
ried adults, particularly same-sex partners, is inconsistent with 
human worth and dignity.249 To the contrary, Professor Rich-
ards has argued, these acts fulfill basic human goods in much 
the same way that Finnis, Bradley, and George advocate for 
sexual relations between a man and a woman within a mar-
riage.250 More recently, other scholars, including Michael San-
del, Carlos Ball, and Chai Feldblum, have advanced related ar-
guments that the sexual intimacy of lesbian and gay couples 
has positive moral value.251 
 
REV. 236, 239 (1998) (“If . . . our moral world contains plural and conflicting 
values, then the overzealous enforcement of general public principles runs the 
risk of interfering with morally legitimate individual and associational prac-
tices.”). 
 247. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 245, at 254. 
 248. See id. at 254–55 (describing the legislator’s difficult task of sifting 
through arguments, “trying to determine which are prejudices or rationaliza-
tions, which presuppose general principles or theories vast parts of the popu-
lation could not be supposed to accept, and so on”). With respect to pornogra-
phy, Professor Dworkin has commented that “it is no substitute simply to 
report that the ordinary man . . . turns his thumb down on the whole busi-
ness.” Id. at 258. 
 249. See generally David A.J. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitu-
tional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1977).  
 250. See id. at 1344–45 (“[A]nti-homosexuality laws violate the moral right 
of people to be treated as persons with fair access to love and self-respect.”).  
 251. See generally Ball, supra note 9; Feldblum, supra note 9; Sandel, su-
pra note 9. Debate also has raged over the positions of some of the earliest 
moral philosophers specifically with respect to sexual relations between same-
sex partners. While natural law scholars maintain, for example, that Aristotle 
and Plato universally condemned homosexuality, the eminent classicist Mar-
tha Nussbaum has taken the position that not only did homosexual sexual 
acts take place between consenting male and female partners, but also that 
those acts “‘took place with social approval and that they were regarded not as 
subverting the fabric of society but rather as tending to reinforce the fabric of 
society.’” See KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 233, at 164–65; see also Daniel 
GOLDBERG.3FMT 4·18·2004  3:17 PM 
2004] MORALS-BASED LAWMAKING 1295 
 
Thus, even among the moral philosophers who advocate a 
role for moral judgments in lawmaking, profound disagreement 
exists about the scope and contents of those judgments.252 This 
disagreement persists notwithstanding the view of many phi-
losophers that a philosophically correct position exists.253 When 
coupled with the views of those who reject reliance on morals 
rationales for official action, it becomes apparent that moral 
philosophers, while usefully elaborating arguments, can pro-
vide limited assistance, at best, to help courts discern defini-
tively which moral arguments are legitimate and which merely 
cover for impermissible intentions. 
3. A Jurisprudence of Unsettled and Contested Mores 
Like the profound disagreements reflected in the work of 
the moral philosophers, the competing moral views at issue in 
the Court’s individual rights cases also demonstrate how diffi-
cult it would be for the Court to adopt a definitive moral 
framework for evaluating morals rationales. Although the 
Court has not always embraced the position of those contesting 
a particular moral mandate in these cases, it unavoidably has 
had to consider the existence of deeply held and divergent 
moral positions on a wide range of issues. 
The post–World War II cases, in particular, markedly 
heightened the Court’s exposure to differing moral positions. At 
that time, much of the country shifted its focus from the “labor 
question” to the political and practical challenges related to the 
country’s demographic diversity.254 Contributing to the change 
 
Mendelsohn, Expert Witness and Ancient Mysteries in a Colorado Courtroom, 
LINGUA FRANCA 34–36 (Sept./Oct. 1996), available at 
http://www.learnedhand.com/nussbaum.htm (discussing debate among classics 
scholars regarding ancient philosophers views of homosexuality during trial of 
Colorado’s Amendment 2). 
 252. Many philosophers, of course, reject the proposition that any type of 
moral consideration is sufficient for lawmaking. See, e.g., HART, supra note 9; 
MILL, supra note 9. As Sanford Levinson has observed, those holding this posi-
tion tend to be “fundamentally dubious of the existence of a shared moral real-
ity.” SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 78 (1988).  
 253. See generally Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 2424 (1992) (describing moral realist arguments that moral truths exist 
and can become known by reasoned analysis). 
 254. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social 
Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 424–25 (2001) (explaining 
that the labor movement pre-1950 “sought reallocation of economic rights and 
workplace entitlements” while “the new social movements of the late twenti-
eth century sought to change the status of marginalized groups. Theirs was a 
politics of recognition.”) (emphasis removed); Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 
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in judicial and popular consciousness were individuals and 
groups whose views and practices had been disapproved by ma-
joritarian lawmakers and who were demanding with increasing 
regularity that popular sentiment not be given legal effect.255 
With such a varied array of moral positions being litigated 
relentlessly, the idea that the Court might select one moral 
framework among many and demonstrate its validity (as op-
posed to its reflection of the Justices’ personal moral views) is, 
to paraphrase Justice White in Bowers, “at best facetious.”256 
Little possibility would exist for the Court, if it rejected the ma-
joritarian position, to avoid the appearance of displacing the 
majority’s moral philosophy in favor of its own. 
Term after term, post–World War II, the Court adjudicated 
numerous cases growing out of the women’s liberation move-
ment, the sexual revolution, and other social movements that 
sought to enhance various freedoms and to unsettle social mo-
res previously treated as set in stone.257 In the equal protection 
context, for example, in the span of several decades, jurispru-
dence regarding the role of women shifted pointedly away from 
embracing a morals-laden view of sex roles to rejecting the ex-
 
1431 (“As democracy’s participants have become more diverse, moral questions 
traditionally regarded as settled often provoke widespread debate.”); cf. Steve 
Fraser, The “Labor Question”, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL 
ORDER: 1930–1980 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (discussing the 
predominance of labor issues from World War I to World War II). 
Of course, in some respects, American history can be described as a prod-
uct of ongoing efforts of social movements to achieve change. From the time of 
the American revolution, groups have been organizing and demanding that 
government provide greater justice to those who live and work in this country. 
See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature 
and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 64–69 (2001) (advocating and de-
veloping an analysis of legal history through consideration of social move-
ments). As Reva Siegel has observed: “Over the life of the Republic, social 
movements have played a significant role in shaping constitutional under-
standings, but constitutional theory barely recognizes the role that constitu-
tional mobilizations play in the construction of constitutional meaning.” Reva 
B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Move-
ment Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 345 (2001). 
 255. See generally Eskridge, supra note 254 (describing and analyzing ad-
vocacy by social movements). 
 256. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Law-
rence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 257. In response, the Court began to tackle many of the issues presented by 
these cases rather than glibly rejecting any challenge to majoritarian views as 
it had earlier in the century. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 
(1946) (sustaining a polygamy conviction under the Mann Act); Lottery Case 
(Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (rejecting a challenge to a state re-
striction of lotteries). 
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istence of sex roles in most contexts.258 Justice Bradley’s 
nineteenth-century concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois,259 with 
its exposition of the “divine ordinance” and “the nature of 
things” that had given rise to sex-specific social roles, famously 
legalized popular presumptions about the natural aptitudes of 
women and men.260 But by the mid-1970s, the easy acceptance 
of majoritarian judgments about the proper roles of men and 
women had gone by the wayside and, in numerous cases, the 
Court carefully reviewed sex-based classifications to insure 
against the very moral or otherwise “natural” roles that it had 
embraced earlier.261 
Similarly, the status of nonmarital children underwent 
significant transformation as the Court shifted from general-
ized acceptance of common law rules privileging “natural” chil-
dren over “illegitimate” children262 to an approach that regu-
larly rejected classifications of children according to their 
parents’ marital status. In 1968, for example, the Court allowed 
nonmarital children to sue for the wrongful death of their 
mother, concluding that “[l]egitimacy or illegitimacy of birth 
has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on 
 
 258. See generally Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and 
the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 209 (1998) (reviewing sex discrimination litigation and analysis from the 
1920s through the late 1990s).  
 259. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
 260. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Even shortly before the midpoint 
of the twentieth century, the Court hearkened back to Justice Bradley’s sen-
timents in Bradwell by concluding that “bartending by women may, in the al-
lowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social problems.” Goesaert 
v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.190 
(1976). 
 261. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982) (re-
viewing a sex-based classification to insure that it did not rely on “fixed no-
tions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females” or presume that 
members of one sex were “innately inferior” to the other); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973) (invalidating sex-based distribution 
scheme for military benefits and recognizing that through “romantic paternal-
ism” toward women, “our statute books gradually became laden with gross, 
stereotyped distinctions between the sexes” that gave rise to “pervasive dis-
crimination”); cf. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (rejecting 
the argument that the Privileges and Immunities Clause mandated women’s 
suffrage). 
 262. See, e.g., Naeglin v. De Cordoba, 171 U.S. 638, 640–41 (1898) 
(“[U]nder the common law illegitimate children did not inherit from their fa-
ther,” but “the statutes of New Mexico introduced a new rule of inheritance: 
‘Natural children, in the absence of legitimate, are heirs to their father’s es-
tate . . . .’ In other words, under this statute, there being no legitimate chil-
dren, illegitimate children inherit.”). 
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the mother” and that discrimination on that basis would be “in-
vidious.”263 
Substantive due process doctrine likewise reveals the 
Court’s awareness of the unstable, contested nature of contem-
porary mores. In contrast to its equal protection cases, the 
Court did not directly reject the moral concerns regarding re-
strictions on access to contraception and abortion at issue in 
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe and numerous other cases related to 
human sexuality decided in the 1960s and 1970s.264 Still, these 
“modern” cases265 necessarily reinforced for the Court the ab-
sence of a monolithic moral code governing the people of the 
United States.  
Challenges to restrictive family definitions also brought be-
fore the Court the many different ways in which people con-
struct their lives and the widely varying moral codes that 
might support those constructions.266 In Michael H. v. Gerald 
D.,267 for example, Justice Scalia expressed his hope that a 
situation in which a married woman conceived a child with a 
man other than her husband and had an intimate relationship 
with a third man was “extraordinary.”268 While the Court ruled 
that parental status belonged only to the husband and wife 
unit, notwithstanding the facts of parentage, Michael H. none-
theless illustrates the Court’s exposure to individuals living 
lives outside the dominant norm.269 
In addition to the equal protection and due process cases 
that exposed the Court to changing mores, cases seeking pro-
tection for free speech rights presented even more vividly the 
 
 263. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). Levy was the first of “[t]he 
modern Court’s frequent encounters with illegitimacy classifications.” GERALD 
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 723 (13th ed. 
1997).  
 264. See supra Part II. 
 265. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 263, at 516. 
 266. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidat-
ing an ordinance that restricted occupancy to nuclear families rather than ex-
tended families when challenged by a woman who lived with her son and two 
grandsons); United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) 
(striking down an administrative rule that prohibited households comprised of 
unrelated persons from receiving food stamps); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the application of a compulsory school atten-
dance law to the parent of a child in an Amish society violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment). 
 267. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 268. Id. at 113. 
 269. Id. 
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diversity of moral views in American society. Many of these 
were in the form of obscenity cases, which exposed the Court to 
sexual practices and values well outside any majoritarian 
moral code.270 Other cases called attention to the discrimination 
faced by socially subordinated groups. In 1958, in One, Inc. v. 
Olesen,271 for example, the Court examined a magazine about 
homosexuality that aimed, in part, “to sponsor educational pro-
grams, lectures and concerts for the aid and benefit of social 
variants.”272 It then summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit’s de-
termination that the magazine was “non-mailable” because it 
contained “cheap pornography” and was otherwise “dirty, vul-
gar, and offensive.”273 
Likewise, through the free exercise cases, the Court was 
exposed not only to those whose views mandated polygamous 
marriage274 but also to individuals whose religious precepts em-
braced animal sacrifice275 and ingestion of peyote.276 Through 
 
 270. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See generally BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT 
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 192–94 (1979) (de-
scribing the Court’s practice under Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), 
of reviewing sexually explicit films that had been declared obscene). 
 271. 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam), rev’g 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957). 
 272. 241 F.2d at 777. 
 273. One, Inc., 355 U.S. 371, rev’g 241 F.2d 772, 774, 777; see also Nat’l Gay 
Task Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, aff’d by an equally divided Court, 
470 U.S. 903 (1985). Much more recently, the Court considered, in the First 
Amendment context, the right of an Irish gay and lesbian organization to 
march in a St. Patrick’s Day parade and the right of an openly gay man to 
serve as a troop leader in the Boy Scouts. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Les-
bian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that Massachusetts 
may not require organizers of a parade to include a gay and lesbian group); 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 430 U.S. 640 (2000) (ruling that the Boy Scouts had 
a First Amendment right to exclude an openly gay scout leader); cf. S.F. Arts 
& Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (finding that a 
“Gay Olympics” event infringed the trademark of the U.S. Olympic Commit-
tee).   
 274. Unlike many of the other instances of exposure to individual diversity, 
the Court first faced the issue of polygamy in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., 
Church of The Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892); Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (rejecting the free exercise defense of a 
Mormon man convicted of plural marriage). 
 275. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520 (1993) (invalidating an ordinance targeted at prohibiting animal sacrifice 
by adherents of Santeria). 
 276. See, e.g., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (uphold-
ing in the unemployment benefits context the application of a law criminaliz-
ing peyote use to individuals who ingested peyote as part of a religious cere-
mony in a Native American church). 
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the conscientious objector cases, the Court similarly became 
familiar with varied individual belief systems.277 
Once the Court began to grapple with these diverse chal-
lenges to traditional mores, the inadequacy of presuming that 
all laws could be justified by reference to promotion of public 
morality became starkly apparent.278 How could the Court rely 
on morality as a justification for sustaining a restriction of con-
duct when it was wrestling each term with the absence of socie-
tal consensus on moral questions and the active shifting of 
popular moral views? What expertise could the Court reasona-
bly claim to assess the relationship between a law and its pur-
ported moral aim or to evaluate the legitimacy of the moral aim 
itself? Not surprisingly, then, the Supreme Court, through its 
actions if not its rhetoric, has sought strenuously to preserve its 
credibility by avoiding engagement with morals-based ration-
ales at nearly every turn.279 
IV.  THE NOT-SO-PUZZLING PERSISTENCE  
OF MORAL JUDGMENTS 
Even as the Supreme Court has eschewed reliance on ex-
plicit morality-based justifications, it has not sought to remove 
all elements of moral judgment from its jurisprudence. 
Notwithstanding Bowers’s flawed conclusion that statements of 
majoritarian morality alone sufficed to justify Georgia’s sodomy 
law, Justice White was probably correct that “[t]he law . . . is 
 
 277. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (finding the ob-
jections to warfare of three conscientious objectors to fit within the statutory 
exemption from training and service in combat); see also Welsh v. United 
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (upholding an exemption from combat service for 
an individual who did not characterize his views as religious).  
 278. Arguably, these presentations of American diversity to the Court 
should have created discomfort with morals-based justifications historically as 
they have more recently. And perhaps they did, if we understand the Court’s 
low level of reliance on morality even in the 1800s to signal early recognition 
of the potential arbitrariness of moral code–based rationales for government 
action. 
 279. Even the Court’s rhetoric has, at times, responded almost defensively 
to the possibility that the Court might appear to be selecting among morals 
rationales according to its members’ preferences. See, e.g, Lawrence v. Texas, 
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003) (stating that the Court was not mandating its 
own moral code regarding the Homosexual Conduct Law); Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (making same statement regarding 
abortion regulation); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 
35, 47 (1966) (stating that it was not the province of the courts to draw on 
jurists’ moral views regarding liquor regulation), overruled on other grounds 
by Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
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constantly based on notions of morality.”280 
This section will identify three levels at which moral judg-
ments remain influential in lawmaking and adjudication, even 
while the Court avoids overt reliance on morals rationales. This 
discussion, coupled with the previous section’s analysis, aims to 
reinforce the urgent need to facilitate meaningful review of ma-
joritarian invocations of morality without demanding the com-
plete eradication of morals-based interests from lawmaking. 
The conclusion, which follows, offers one potential approach to 
resolve this tension. 
First, most broadly, normative judgments about individual 
and societal well-being underlie arguments about the quality 
and quantity of authority that should be accorded to both 
courts and legislators.281 For example, those who believe that 
the harm from restricting individual autonomy outweighs the 
harm caused by the behavior of autonomous individuals might 
advocate a libertarian position that would allow official inter-
vention only to prevent “harm to others.”282 On the other hand, 
a different moral vision would support the Aristotelian view 
that all branches of government should concern themselves 
with individual moral goodness283 or a position that encouraged 
government to balance concern for individual morality with 
protection of individual autonomy.284 Even pragmatists who op-
pose morals-based laws on the consequentialist ground that 
they present more dangers than benefits bring to that position 
a normative vision regarding the relative dangers presented by 
 
 280. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 
123 S. Ct. 2472. See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 109 
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that “much legislation . . . is 
grounded, at least in part, on a concern with the morality of the community”) 
(emphasis added). Reinforcing the difficulty in ascertaining dominant moral 
views that could appropriately be the basis for regulation, Justice Brennan 
observed in Paris Adult Theatre I that “the State’s interest in regulating mo-
rality by suppressing obscenity, while often asserted, remains essentially un-
focused and ill defined.” Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also POSNER, supra 
note 9, at 137 (“Morality is a pervasive feature of social life and is in the back-
ground of many legal principles.”). 
 281. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL 
THEORY (1981) (arguing that liberalism’s support for governmental neutrality 
among diverse aims does not represent a non-neutral position). 
 282. See MILL, supra note 9, at 82. 
 283. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (David Ross trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1988). 
 284. See, e.g., DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 245, at 
180–83 (advocating limited government intervention to secure equal concern 
and respect); RAZ, supra note 241 (advancing a perfectionist position).  
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individual action and government oversight.   
Second, and more narrowly, moral judgments help deter-
mine whether and how society should respond to acts that are 
viewed as having a negative impact on constitutive conditions 
or other negative consequences. The decisions about whether 
and how to regulate nude dancing because of heightened crime 
rates in neighboring communities provide a useful illustra-
tion.285 While widespread agreement exists that crime is harm-
ful, some legislators or judges might accept any action that 
would reduce crime, while others might advocate or sustain 
only limited restrictions (or no restrictions at all) to safeguard 
freedom of expression. This valuation process necessarily works 
from a moral framework—or at least a framework that reflects 
nonempirical, abstract views about what is good for society. 
Third, and perhaps most profoundly, moral judgments in-
form how judges and lawmakers define “harm.”286 As we have 
seen, different moral philosophers can, with absolute convic-
tion, deem the same act, such as sexual intimacy between 
same-sex partners, to be either constitutive of or instrumental 
in enhancing or destroying human goodness, the only difference 
between them being their moral philosophical stances.287 Or, to 
consider an example touched on in Lawrence, some would con-
sider the denial of marriage rights to gay people to be grossly 
injurious to the dignity of lesbians and gay men and the com-
munities in which they live.288 Others consider the prospect of 
 
 285. See supra notes 126–49 and accompanying text (discussing cases regu-
lating nude dancing establishments). 
 286. As Professor Dworkin has observed in connection with his critique of 
Lord Devlin’s position regarding the relationship between law and morality, 
“[w]hat is shocking and wrong is not [Devlin’s] idea that the community’s mo-
rality counts, but his idea of what counts as the community’s morality.” See 
Dworkin, Lord Devlin, supra note 9, at 1001.  
 287. See supra notes 232–35, 249–51 and accompanying text; cf. Robert C. 
Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 101 (2003) (observing that the Court in Lawrence 
“avoid[ed] inflammatory accusations of bigotry by acknowledging the ‘profound 
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles’ that support 
condemnation of ‘homosexual conduct as immoral’” (quoting Lawrence v. 
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003)).  
 288. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996) (cham-
pioning the legalization of marriage for lesbian and gay couples); Thomas 
Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIANS, GAY 
MEN, AND THE LAW 398 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) (same); Mary C. 
Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles 
in the Nineties, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 63 (1991) (noting that marriage for same-sex 
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same-sex couples’ marriages to represent one of the greatest 
present dangers to civilization.289  
But the influence of moral judgment is not limited to as-
sessments of nonmaterial harms. Even determinations that 
concrete injuries amount to cognizable harms to others are, ul-
timately, informed by judgments about what harm means. Ear-
lier, in the Introduction, I offered the example of a pie-throwing 
incident, which could be considered either harmful or not de-
pending on one’s definition of harm. Many other weightier ex-
amples could be analyzed similarly. Consider, for example, the 
use of race discrimination to sustain apartheid, the facilitation 
of murder to preserve a family’s honor, and the imposition of 
the death penalty as a form of deterrence and retribution. By 
some, these actions are considered to be profound harms that 
endanger both individuals and society; to others, these same 
acts are essential to preserving individual and societal well-
being.290 Thus, no matter how carefully we might disavow moral 
 
couples will lead to greater societal acceptance of homosexuality).  
In Lawrence, the majority never mentioned marriage directly, comment-
ing instead that the case did not “involve whether the government must give 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.” 
Lawrence, 123 U.S. at 2484. Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia, in their re-
spective opinions, each addressed specifically the relationship of Lawrence to 
marriage rights for same-sex couples. See id. at 2488 (suggesting that reasons 
other than morality “exist to promote the institution of marriage”) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring); id. at 2495–96 (urging that morality supplies a sufficient justi-
fication to support “laws refusing to recognize homosexual marriage”) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 289. See, e.g., James M. Donovan, Rock-Salting the Slippery Slope: Why 
Same-Sex Marriage Is Not a Commitment to Polygamous Marriage, 29 N. KY. 
L. REV. 521, 522 (2002) (noting that conservatives’ position on marriage rights 
for same-sex couples “inevitably leads to predications of apocalyptic cries 
warning of ‘death of marriage and civilization itself’” (quoting E.J. GRAFF, 
WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 32 (1999))); Wendy Herdlein, Something Old, Some-
thing New: Does the Massachusetts Constitution Provide for Same-Sex “Mar-
riage”?, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 137, 181 (2002) (characterizing the recent Mas-
sachusetts same-sex marriage decision as “judicial tyranny”); Molly 
McDonough, Gay Marriage Decision Harks Back 55 Years, ABA J. E-REPORT, 
Nov. 21, 2003 (observing that opponents of marriage for lesbians and gay men, 
including President George W. Bush, were extremely critical of the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court ruling that marriage restrictions based on sex 
violated the state’s constitution in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941 (2003)), at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/ 
nov21marry.html. 
 290. For general discussion of differing viewpoints on these issues, see, re-
spectively, DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); Rachel A. Ruane, 
Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence Against Women in Jordan and Paki-
stan, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1523, 1527–28, 1528 n.30 (2000); LOUIS P. 
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judgments in light of the challenges they present for adjudica-
tors, they are inextricably bound up in our lawmaking and, as a 
result, inevitably present in our adjudication as well. 
V.  CONCLUSION: A TENTATIVE PROPOSAL  
TO RELIEVE MORAL DISCOMFORT 
The Court’s reluctance to engage with morals justifications 
coupled with the unavoidable presence of moral judgments in 
lawmaking leave us with a final question: How can courts best 
ensure that morals rationales will not be misused, given the 
difficulty inherent in distinguishing legitimate moral sentiment 
from impermissible bias? The previous sections suggest at least 
one proposal for minimizing judicial moral discomfort that I 
will develop and analyze here. 
To recap the problems with judicial reliance on morals jus-
tifications, we saw earlier that the equal protection and due 
process guarantees require courts to ensure that moral justifi-
cations are not being proffered to cover up impermissible gov-
ernment interests. By presuming morals rationales to be le-
gitimate because they have received popular approval, a court 
may fail to uncover invidious bias. But a court that does not 
presume majoritarian moral sentiment to be legitimate risks 
appearing to substitute its moral judgment for that of the peo-
ple. The diversity of available moral positions makes it 
virtually impossible for a court that doubts the majority’s moral 
aims to demonstrate that it has discerned the correct moral po-
sition from among all others. That moral philosophers cannot 
persuade each other to agree on a single moral code under-
scores further the implausibility of a court ever credibly mak-
ing the case that it has found the moral answer. 
Still, courts select regularly among competing analyses of 
situations proffered by experts and lay witnesses,291 so the di-
versity of moral philosophical positions and popular views re-
garding a particular moral stance should not in itself create an 
insurmountable barrier to successful review. 
The challenge for courts, then, stems not so much from the 
existence of competing expert or lay views as from judges’ in-
ability to point to an external source—i.e., something other 
 
POJMAN & JEFFREY REIMAN, THE DEATH PENALTY: FOR AND AGAINST (1998). 
 291. See generally Edward K. Cheng, Changing Scientific Evidence, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 315 (2003) (discussing the difficulties faced by courts in analyz-
ing evolving scientific evidence). 
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than personal preferences—to justify the selection of a particu-
lar moral framework. In contrast to the ordinary situation, 
where fact-finding is used to justify judicial decision making, 
factual assessment is irrelevant to weighing the legitimacy of 
an abstract, nonconsequentialist moral prohibition. Yet without 
factual references, a court has little to demonstrate that its 
evaluation of a morals justification reflects objective, reasoned 
judgment rather than deference to its own views or to the likes 
and dislikes of those who dominate the lawmaking process. 
So, for example, if a government maintains that moral con-
cerns justify a prohibition against particular sexual conduct, as 
in Lawrence, no evidence can be taken to address meaningfully 
the existence of that moral position. A court deciding a chal-
lenge to that law must instead attempt to develop a moral phi-
losophical analysis that avoids the Scylla of unquestioning def-
erence to majoritarian preferences and the Charybdis of 
imposing its own moral views without the benefit of empirical 
evidence to guide its course. 
This sort of philosophical tightrope walking is not a task 
for which courts, which are structured to elicit facts and inter-
pret and apply relevant law, are institutionally well suited. In-
deed, Georgia defended its sodomy law in Bowers in part based 
on this institutional competence theory, arguing that “[t]he leg-
islative process is acutely designed for [the purpose of assessing 
societal values and morality] whereas the judiciary may be in-
clined to make determinations based upon more empirical evi-
dence, to which this area is not particularly amenable.”292 
Because the absence of factual grounding seems to be at 
the root of the Court’s difficulties in evaluating morals ration-
ales, a requirement that fact-based rationales exist to explain 
government action could represent an important step, albeit a 
partial one, toward a solution. In particular, if governments are 
limited to adopting laws and policies that can be justified by 
reference to observable or otherwise demonstrable harms, the 
tension that arises from courts being asked to analyze justifica-
tions in the absence of evidence, such as morals rationales, will 
be mitigated.293 
 
 292. Petitioner’s Brief at 36, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 
85-140). 
 293. Even if government action gives effect to moral aims (or other abstract 
norms, such as decency or disgust), the presence of a factual justification in 
addition to a purely morals-based rationale would enable a court to make a 
meaningful evaluation of the fact-based interest.  
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As an example, consider the way a fact-based evaluation 
might proceed with respect to the highly contested regulation of 
marijuana.294 If government prohibits people from smoking 
marijuana, evidence could be introduced regarding potential 
health-related harms caused by that activity.295 Debate could 
ensue between the parties or among members of a judicial 
panel regarding whether marijuana actually causes the alleged 
harm.296 Debate also could take place as to whether the gov-
ernment’s action in this instance responds appropriately to the 
identified harm.297 Although there will likely be disagreement, 
whatever the outcome, a court’s acceptance of a particular set 
of facts can be studied and critiqued in a way that a court’s em-
brace of an abstract moral norm cannot.  
Likewise, in Romer, the Court considered, as a factual mat-
ter, the validity of Colorado’s proffered justification that the 
state constitutional ban on antidiscrimination protections for 
gay people would save limited resources or protect individuals’ 
associational rights.298 It was then able to reach the empirically 
supportable conclusion that the connection between the 
 
 294. See, e.g., Suzanne D. McGuire, Comment, Medical Marijuana: State 
Law Undermines Federal Marijuana Policy—Is the Establishment Going to 
Pot?, 7 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 73, 73 (1997) (“Availability of medical 
marijuana . . . remains . . . the subject of heated debate at the federal level, 
both in the legislature and with administrative agencies. . . . [V]arious state 
legislatures, courts and voters have moved toward easier availability of mari-
juana for medicinal use.”); see also Joel Stein, The New Politics of Pot, TIME, 
Nov. 4, 2002, at 57 (reporting on the heated debate on the legalization of mari-
juana that rages in social, political, and legal fora). 
 295. See, e.g., LESTER GRINSPOON, M.D. & JAMES B. BAKALAR, 
MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 3–4 (1993) (describing the historical 
development of therapeutic and other uses of marijuana); Jerome P. Kassirer, 
M.D., Federal Foolishness and Marijuana, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 366, 366–67 
(1997) (arguing that federal policy prohibiting marijuana use is absurd in light 
of the medical benefits of marijuana); Eric E. Sterling, Drug Policy: A Smor-
gasbord of Conundrums Spiced by Emotions Around Children and Violence, 31 
VAL. U. L. REV. 597, 622 (1997) (detailing the modern trend of criminalizing 
marijuana); cf. John Cloud, Is Pot Good for You?, TIME, Nov. 4, 2002, at 62 
(providing support that marijuana, despite potentially providing relief on cer-
tain illnesses, is nevertheless unhealthy, but only mildly so). 
 296. See, e.g., GLEN HANSON ET AL., DRUGS AND SOCIETY 377 (6th ed. 2001) 
(discussing negative effects of marijuana use); GARY J. MILLER, DRUGS AND 
THE LAW: DETECTION, RECOGNITION, & INVESTIGATION 409–11 (1992) (same); 
John P. Walters, The Myth of “Harmless” Marijuana, WASH. POST, May 1, 
2002, at A25. 
 297. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 294, at 57 (reflecting polls demonstrating 
that the overwhelming majority of Americans would legalize marijuana for 
medical purposes and penalize recreational use with, at most, a fine). 
 298. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
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amendment and the aims was too attenuated to accomplish ei-
ther goal in a nonarbitrary fashion.299 In contrast, had the 
Court decided the case based on the morality justification of-
fered for the Colorado amendment, it would not have needed to 
disclose its reasoning because current doctrine simply pre-
sumes the legitimacy of a morals rationale. 
To be sure, the proposal would not fully resolve the diffi-
culty inherent in judicial review of government action based on 
composite or embedded moral concerns. Indeed, some would ar-
gue, empirical evidence can always be marshaled to veil a mor-
als rationale. In addition, as discussed in Part IV, above, both 
conscious and unconscious biases can shape a court’s response 
to factual, as well as morals-based, justifications.300 Further 
still, courts may, whether out of bias or deference to the legisla-
tive branch, accept highly speculative arguments about factual 
harms and thereby render the empirical grounding require-
ment useless. 
These limitations are illustrated well by two of the first 
post-Lawrence cases to address governmental discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. In Lofton v. Secretary of the De-
partment of Children & Family Service,301 the 11th Circuit sus-
tained Florida’s ban on adoption by lesbians and gay men and 
accepted as a rational basis for the law the argument that het-
erosexuals are better situated to provide a stable, nurturing 
environment for the education of adopted children than lesbi-
ans and gay men.302 Yet, the preference for heterosexual par-
ents, when examined closely, does not appear to rest on any 
factual considerations other than that heterosexuals can, pre-
sumably, provide post-puberty guidance to their children re-
garding heterosexual relationships.303 If it was not otherwise 
 
 299. Id.  
 300. For discussion of these biases in the context of race discrimination, see 
Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and 
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
 301. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 2004 WL 
161275 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 302. Id. at *11. 
 303. Id. at *14. Related to this point, the Court highlighted the historical 
acceptance of parenthood within marriage of a man and a woman, writing: 
Although social theorists from Plato to Simone de Beauvoir have pro-
posed alternative child-rearing arrangements, none has proven as en-
during as the marital family structure, nor has the accumulated wis-
dom of several millennia of human experience discovered a superior 
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apparent, the inability of these purported factual justifications 
to explain meaningfully the state’s line-drawing becomes par-
ticularly clear when the state’s ban on adoption by lesbian and 
gay parents is considered within the overall framework of the 
state’s adoption law, which permits adoption by unmarried het-
erosexual individuals and permits foster parenting by lesbians 
and gay men.304 Notwithstanding the thinness of the factual 
grounds, the Court upheld Florida’s ban under an analysis con-
sistent with the one proposed here, suggesting that the empiri-
cal support requirement may not provide a meaningful con-
straint. 
Similarly, in State v. Limon, the Kansas Court of Appeals 
upheld a state law that subjected the defendant to a seventeen-
year sentence rather than a fifteen-month sentence because he 
had consensual oral sex with a fourteen-year-old boy rather 
than a girl of the same age.305 As in Lofton, the justifications ac-
cepted by the Court amounted to factual characterizations of 
normative preferences for heterosexuality. For example, the 
Court found the differential punishment to be “rationally re-
lated to the purpose of protecting and preserving the tradi-
tional sexual mores of society and the historical sexual devel-
opment of children.”306 Although that rationale described the 
criminal law’s preference for heterosexuality, it did not explain 
why heterosexuality was preferable, as equal protection re-
quires.307 
Indeed, the justifications accepted in Limon and Lofton are 
reminiscent of the fact-based justification rejected by the Su-
preme Court in Palmore v. Sidoti.308 There, a white father had 
 
model. Against this “sum of experience,” it is rational for Florida to 
conclude that it is in the best interests of adoptive children, many of 
whom come from troubled and unstable backgrounds, to be placed in 
a home anchored by both a father and a mother. 
See id. at *11 (internal citations omitted). 
 304. Id. at *13–15. 
 305. 2004 WL 177649 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). 
 306. Id. at *7. 
 307. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“[E]ven in the or-
dinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we 
insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the ob-
ject to be attained.”); see also State v. Limon, 2004 WL 177649, *20 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2004) (Pierron, J., dissenting) (“Legislative disapproval of homosexuality 
alone is not enough to justify any measures the legislature might choose to ex-
press its disapproval. . . . A rational basis must be rational and supported by a 
reasonable cause and effect relationship to qualify.”). 
 308. 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). 
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argued for transferring custody of his daughter to him because 
of his former wife’s relationship with an African-American 
man. The Court considered the factually grounded concern that 
the child would be subjected to heightened pressures as a result 
of her mother’s interracial relationship309 but ultimately re-
jected it. “Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,” 
the Court wrote, “but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give 
them effect.”310 Although Palmore involved a racial classifica-
tion and received higher scrutiny311 than the sexual orienta-
tion–based classifications in Lofton and Limon, under rational 
basis review it is also well settled that courts cannot give effect 
to prejudice, even when those prejudices are expressed in fac-
tual rather than moral or other abstract terms.312 
While the factual grounding requirement would not forbid 
judicial acceptance of the types of justifications accepted in 
Lofton and Limon (and rejected in Palmore), the proposed 
framework still would be preferable to the current approach be-
cause it demands at least some analysis rather than according 
carte blanche any time the government justifies its actions in 
terms of morality. Because fact-based reasoning, as opposed to 
moral philosophical arguments, tends to be publicly accessible, 
a court potentially will be exposed to greater scrutiny—and 
greater criticism—by both dissenting judges313 and the general 
public if it accepts dubious facts to allow a traditional moral 
regulation to survive.314 This, in turn, may have a constraining 
 
 309. Id. at 433 (“It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic 
prejudices do not exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices have been 
eliminated. There is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different 
race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not present if the 
child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin.”). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 432–33. 
 312. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 313. For example, Judge Pierron’s dissent in Limon considered and re-
jected the factually framed justifications for the state’s differential criminal 
punishment of same-sex and different-sex sexual relations between eighteen-
year-olds and fourteen-year-olds. See, e.g., State v. Limon, 2004 WL 177649, 
*20–22 (2004) (Pierron, J., dissenting) (considering justifications related to 
pregnancy, marriage and venereal diseases and concluding that “[t]he purpose 
of the law is not to accomplish any of the stated aims other than to punish 
homosexuals more severely than heterosexuals for doing the same admittedly 
criminal acts”). 
 314. Though the factual grounding requirement could be strengthened to 
address the problem of facts as well as abstract rationales being used to cover 
impermissibly biased aims, ordinary rational basis review should, at least in 
theory, require meaningful legitimate explanations for government action. See 
GOLDBERG.3FMT 4·18·2004  3:17 PM 
1310 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 88:1233 
 
effect on courts otherwise inclined to accept nonlegitimate or 
nonexplanatory morals rationales. 
Finally, some will reject the proposal as reflecting values 
inconsistent with their preferred method of governance. Liber-
tarians, for example, would likely find the requirement that 
government can act in response to empirically demonstrable 
harms to be insufficiently restrictive. As proposed here, the 
standard does not limit government action to harms to others 
but rather would allow government to address all harms, in-
cluding harms to self, that are capable of factual demonstra-
tion. For example, to the extent research demonstrated physi-
cal harms flowing from marijuana use, as in the example 
above, government conceivably could regulate on that basis, 
even if the use was purely personal and in the home. 
Others will find the proposal to limit reliance on morals-
based rationales undesirable because they view morality as not 
only sufficient but also an important independent basis for 
lawmaking.315 Still others may find the proposal impractical be-
cause they see moral judgments as so fundamentally inter-
twined with the most concrete- and practical-seeming harms so 
as to render empirical and morals rationales analytically  
 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (describing the need for rational 
connection between the classification and the justification offered for it, even 
under the lowest level of review); cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without 
Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004) (contrasting the weak and strong versions 
of rational basis review).  
A related concern about the factual evidence requirement would be that it 
might heighten the otherwise weak burden on governments defending meas-
ures that do not make suspect classifications or infringe fundamental rights. 
However, the requirement does not mandate the introduction at trial admissi-
ble evidence amounting to conclusive proof of the need for the regulation. In-
stead, whether proffered by the government or identified by the court itself, 
the facts considered for purpose of rational basis review would need to illus-
trate only that the government could reasonably conceive that its act would 
serve a legitimate government interest. Cf. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–
21 (1993) (“A statute is presumed constitutional and ‘[t]he burden is on the 
one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis 
which might support it,’ whether or not the basis has a foundation in the re-
cord.” (internal citation omitted)). This analytic framework provides a mean-
ingful opportunity for courts to fulfill their responsibility under rational basis 
review rather than taking entirely on faith the government’s morals-based de-
fense of its actions. An abstract rationale like morality would not suffice be-
cause without a minimal empirical grounding, a court cannot perform the 
most basic function of assessing whether the government’s acts are reasonable 
or wholly arbitrary.  
 315. See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 9; Finnis, supra note 9. 
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indistinguishable.316 
From whatever vantage point, however, the institutional-
competence question posed here can no longer be sidestepped 
with a paean to lawmakers’ traditional powers to forbid actions 
contra bonos mores. Whatever one thinks of the propriety or 
necessity of government action to protect the public’s morals, 
the question of how to ensure that morality does not wind up 
providing a benign cloak for invidious preferences must be an-
swered. Although Bowers’s explicit embrace of a moral disap-
proval argument coupled with the Court’s staunch rhetorical 
support for morals-based exercises of the police power long ob-
scured this difficulty, Lawrence has now called the question. 
Those who would defend morals-based lawmaking cannot 
credibly avoid responding.  
 
 
 316. See, e.g., Dworkin, Lord Devlin, supra note 9.  
